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TO THE VICTOR GOES THE TOIL—REMEDIES
FOR REGULATED PARTIES IN SEPARATIONOF-POWERS LITIGATION*
KENT BARNETT**
The U.S. Constitution imposes three key limits on the design of
federal agencies. It constrains how agency officers are appointed,
the extent of their independence from the President, and the
range of issues that they can decide. Scholars have trumpeted the
importance of these safeguards with soaring rhetoric. And the
Supreme Court has permitted regulated parties to vindicate these
safeguards through implied private rights of action under the
Constitution. Regulated parties, for their part, have been
successfully challenging agency structure with increased
frequency—as the recent ongoing separation-of-powers actions
against the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) indicate. At
the same time, regulated parties, courts, and scholars have largely
ignored the practical question of “structural remedies”—i.e., how
to remedy the violation of structural safeguards for prevailing
regulated parties. This inattention may arise because courts often
provide what seems at first blush to be an appropriate remedy:
severing the structural defect from an agency’s “organic” act. In
fact, however, structural remedies often fail to satisfy core
remedial values relevant to regulated parties—namely,
compensating past harm, preventing future harm from the past
defect, incentivizing regulated parties to seek redress, and
deterring structural violations—and may even leave regulated
parties in a worse place than they occupied before asserting the
challenge. These ineffectual remedies thereby undermine the very
safeguards that judicial decisions purport to vindicate and render
any “private right” potentially illusory. Courts, in response, can
improve the status quo. They could select (or Congress could
provide) better remedies, and this Article considers how they
could do so. But if structural remedies cannot be sufficiently
* © 2014 Kent Barnett.
** Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate helpful
comments from Bill Araiza, Dan Coenen, Ron Krotoszynski, Jeff Lubbers, Sharon Rush,
Mark Seidenfeld, David Shipley, Chris Walker, Kathryn Watts, and participants of the
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Law School.
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improved, courts should either become more candid about the
underlying safeguards’ limitations or reconsider altogether the
nature of the safeguards and regulated parties’ relationship to
them.
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INTRODUCTION
“Next to a battle lost, the greatest misery is a battle gained.”
-Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington1
For nearly two decades, the United States Supreme Court has
welcomed regulated parties’ separation-of-powers challenges to the
federal administrative state. These constitutional challenges include
efforts to limit agencies’ power based upon the Appointments Clause,
the President’s implied supervisory powers under Article II, and the
judiciary’s powers under Article III.2 The Court has indicated that
prevailing litigants are entitled to a meaningful remedy3 and has
recognized private rights of action under the Constitution to assert
these structural challenges.4 Parties that are regulated by federal
administrative agencies have noted the Court’s apparent enthusiasm
and have begun regularly asserting these and other structural
challenges, including recent ones based on the President’s recess
appointments of certain members to the NLRB and the director of
the CFPB.5 But prevailing regulated parties often obtain not only an
unsatisfactory judicial remedy, but one that may place them in an
even worse position than the one they occupied before bringing suit.
The remedies, too, may be ill-defined and may fail to resolve what
effect a separation-of-powers violation has on other agency actions
and other regulated parties. These remedial deficiencies result from
the failure to consider familiar remedial values when crafting
remedies for structural or systemic violations to the administrative
1. FRANCES SPALDING, JOHN PIPER, MYFANWY PIPER: LIVES IN ART 433 (2009).
2. Other structural challenges exist, but they are much less common. See generally
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (concerning the “legislative veto”); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (concerning the nondelegation
doctrine). The remedies for these challenges are less troubling than the remedies for
successful structural challenges discussed in this Article because the prevailing party
obtains meaningful substantive relief. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928 (invalidating
congressional action that would have led to the immigrant’s deportation); Schechter, 295
U.S. at 551 (reversing the defendants’ conviction).
3. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 188 (1995).
4. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151
n.2 (2010).
5. See generally New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674 (2010) (holding that
the NLRB lacked a quorum under the governing statute to act); Noel Canning v. NLRB,
705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the recess appointments of NLRB members
were unconstitutional), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281);
Richards v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing a challenge to recess
appointments based on lack of standing); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240–45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032
(D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466 (asserting several structural challenges to the
CFPB).
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state. This failure, in turn, limits the efficacy of the very structural
safeguards that courts purport to vindicate.
For a concrete sense of the problem, consider the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.6 There,
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) had
begun investigating the auditing practices of the plaintiff, an
accounting firm.7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) established the
board as an independent entity within the Securities Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), itself an independent agency, to regulate
accounting and auditing firms.8 The SEC appointed the board’s
members and could remove them for certain causes.9 The plaintiff
argued that the board’s independence improperly impeded the
President’s supervisory powers under Article II.10 The Court agreed,
holding that the board members enjoyed too much protection from
at-will removal.11 However, the Court did not prevent the board from
taking any actions under SOX, as the plaintiffs had requested.12
Instead, it simply severed the board members’ statutory protection
from removal from office by the SEC, rendering them removable at
will and thus sufficiently subject to presidential oversight to cure the
structural defect.13 The Court remanded the matter to the board for
further proceedings,14 declaring SOX “fully operative.”15
This remedy might seem proportionate to the violation. By
permitting the SEC to remove the board members at will, the Court
addressed the structural harm in the statutory scheme. Invalidating all
of the board’s powers would seem too severe a sanction when the
Court could easily sever the offending provision. The remedy also

6.
7.
8.
9.

130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
Id. at 3149.
Id. at 3147.
Id. at 3147–48. These causes that served as the basis for removal proceedings were

that the [PCAOB] member “(A) has willfully violated any provision of th[e SOX]
Act, the rules of the Board, of the securities laws; (B) has willfully abused the
authority of that members; or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has
failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional
standard by any registered public accounting firm or associated person thereof.”
Id. at 3148 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3)(2006).
10. Id. at 3149.
11. See id. at 3151–61.
12. See id. at 3161.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 3164.
15. Id. at 3161 (internal quotations omitted).
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appeared to comport with settled norms of judicial restraint and
attentiveness to Congress’s likely fallback position.16
But the remedy from the prevailing litigant’s vantage point looks
different. Despite the firm’s successful structural challenge, the Court
provided an inconsequential remedy. It did not prevent the board
from functioning, invalidate any past actions of the board,17 enjoin the
board from investigating the regulated firm, require a wholly new
administrative investigation, or limit the board’s substantive powers.18
The accounting firm recovered no damages or attorneys’ fees, despite
the availability of such compensation in other constitutional
litigation.19 Instead, the investigation simply continued with
proceedings, at least in the firm’s view, before potentially hostile
board members who were now stripped of independence from the
SEC and the President. Whether the board members would actually
retaliate against the firm hardly matters to a regulated party; the mere
risk of subtle retaliation is likely enough to counsel caution.
Ultimately, the prevailing litigant incurred significant costs only to
end up where it began, except this time before a potentially resentful
board. The accounting firm could be forgiven for wondering why it
brought a structural challenge at all. And future litigants—especially
those that repeatedly interact with an agency—might think it wise to
ignore other structural defects.
Consider, too, the remedy from Congress’s perspective. Congress
created the PCAOB and impinged upon the President’s supervisory
power. But Congress paid little, if any, price for its constitutional
violation. The board lost no substantive powers, and the Court did
not task Congress with rethinking the board’s structure. Despite
losing the power to structure the administrative state in a particular
way, Congress paid no serious price for establishing an
unconstitutional agency. Indeed, after Free Enterprise Fund,
substantive decisions remain shielded from the President’s control. In

16. See id.; Brianne J. Gorod, The Collateral Consequences of Ex Post Judicial Review,
88 WASH. L. REV. 903, 952–53 (2013).
17. In Free Enterprise Fund, the agency had not yet issued a final order. See Free
Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (permitting review of the constitutional issue despite no
final agency action).
18. See infra Part III for a discussion of remedies in other separation-of-powers
litigation.
19. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (2006) (permitting damages and attorneys’ fees
for federal law violations by those acting under color of state law); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 (1971) (providing damages against federal officers
for Fourth Amendment violations).
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light of the Court’s remedy, future Congresses may wonder why they
should bother considering structural matters.
Buckley v. Valeo20 illustrates similar points. There, the Court
held that all members of the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”)
were installed in violation of the Appointments Clause.21 The
prevailing parties requested that the Court shut down the FEC and
invalidate all of its powers and prior actions.22 The Court, however,
while invalidating the FEC’s future exercise of “executive” powers,
validated the agency’s past actions.23 The parties, despite prevailing,
were thus bound by an unconstitutionally constituted body’s actions.
Moreover, the Court stayed its judgment for thirty days, permitting
the FEC to wield its original powers during that transitive period in
which Congress could consider how to restructure the Commission.24
Put simply, the Court permitted what was probably the most
structurally defective agency ever created to continue to act and
validated its past actions.25
Free Enterprise Fund and Buckley are not aberrational. Other
decisions’ remedies for systemic violations reveal similar
deficiencies.26 These problems, too, are almost sure to proliferate
because of the increased frequency of structural challenges by
regulated parties, the Court’s increasingly formal separation-ofpowers doctrines, and Congress’s failure to comply with structural
safeguards when fashioning administrative structures in the recent
past.27 Indeed, aside from the challenges discussed in detail later in
this Article, regulated parties have recently (and sometimes
successfully) asserted separation-of-powers challenges against the
CFPB and the NLRB to prevent the agencies from acting, but they
have done so without confronting the possibility of receiving an
inadequate remedy.28 When successful, these parties have not
20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
21. See id. at 140.
22. See id. at 140.
23. See id. at 137–42.
24. See id. at 143.
25. See infra note 291.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; First Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240–45, State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner,
No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012), 2012 WL 4229466; Brief and Required
Appendix of Petitioner at 56, Richards v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 121973 & 12-1984) (petitioner’s brief requesting that the court remand the matter for action
only when the NLRB had a proper quorum); Jim Puzzanghera, Lawsuit Challenges
Consumer Protection Bureau, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com
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obtained clear remedial guidance from the courts,29 revealing the
timeliness and importance of discussing judicial remedies for
structural violations.30 There is, too, a deeper problem: the parties
rarely brief the issue of remedies in any detail, and the courts rarely
even consider remedial alternatives or the normative goals that they
have recognized in other settings as critical for fashioning proper
remedies.31 Given the inextricable connection between rights and
remedies,32 the courts’ actions raise broad questions about the
meaningfulness and nature of the substantive limits that they have
imposed on administrative agencies’ structure.
Nor are the courts and parties alone in ignoring remedies. In the
1950s, Professor Charles Alan Wright remarked upon the academy’s
failure to consider the law of remedies.33 In the decades since,
scholars have considered judicial remedies for constitutional
/2012/jun/22/business/la-fi-banks-lawsuit-20120623; Kevin Bogardus, Senate Republicans
Join Suit Against NLRB Recess Appointments, THE HILL (Sept. 26, 2012),
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/258843-senate-republicans-join-suit-against-nlrbrecess-appointments (discussing a recess-appointment challenge brought in the D.C.
Circuit).
29. See generally Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that
the recess appointments of NLRB members were unconstitutional but providing no
remedial discussion), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2861 (U.S. June 24, 2013) (No. 12-1281).
Before the Senate confirmed Richard Cordray as director of the CFPB in July 2013, see
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, Vote Number 174, U.S. SENATE
(July 16, 2013), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm
?congress=113&session=1&vote=00174, legal blogs noted the uncertainty that a successful
challenge to his recess appointment would have faced, see Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Senate
Republicans Officially Weigh In On Cordray’s Nomination, CFPB MONITOR BLOG (Feb.
1, 2013), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/02/01/the-senate-republicans-officially-weighin-on-cordrays-nomination/.
30. Commentators have begun to notice these remedial concerns in separation-ofpowers litigation. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky, D.C. Circuit May Soon Invalidate President
Obama’s NLRB Recess Appointments: Implications for CFPB, CFPB MONITOR BLOG
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/01/10/d-c-court-of-appeals-may-sooninvalidate-president-obamas-nlrb-recess-appointments-implications-for-cfpb/ (“Would any
or all of the CFPB’s actions since Mr. Cordray was appointed be invalid? How do you
unscramble the egg? What about future CFPB actions?”).
31. For instance, courts consider the values of deterrence and compensation in tort
and contract matters, see generally infra Part II.B, and they consider deterrence, incentive
to litigate, and other values when fashioning injunctions for violations of certain
constitutional rights, see Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1358 (1991).
32. See infra Part II.A; cf. RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 59
(5th ed. 2012) (“[T]he precise remedy sought by the parties and awarded by the court will
reveal important information about the formation of contract.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 931 n.317 (1999)
(referring to Lon Fuller’s contracts casebook that began by discussing remedies).
33. See Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET.
L.J. 376, 376 (1955).
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violations, but they have generally concentrated on federalism
concerns over injunctions triggered by state and municipal violations
of specific constitutional amendments.34 Some recent scholarship
considers the proper role of injunctive relief for all constitutional
violations35 and the potential for remedial nuance to mitigate the
consequences of invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds
generally.36 But none of this work has broadly considered the kind of
remedies that a regulated party should receive for successfully
challenging the structure of the administrative state.37 This omission is
problematic because, as explored below, structural challenges have
characteristics that render an effective remedy for a prevailing
regulated party difficult to craft. Likewise, scholars have considered
the effect of the Court’s recent separation-of-powers jurisprudence on
the competing branches of government or constitutional theory.38 But
they have not considered a more important problem to those under
regulatory supervision: whether the Court’s structural remedies for
regulated parties render the substantive norms practically ineffective.

34. For scholarly discussion of the federalism implications of injunctive relief, see
generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: the Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972); Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1979); Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983); Alfred
Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Levinson, supra note 32;
Henry P. Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975);
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Sturm, supra note
31.
35. See John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 5 (2013).
36. See Gorod, supra note 16, at 949–51.
37. The key exception is scholarship that has considered the de facto officer doctrine’s
proper role in remedying invalid appointments. See infra Part III.B. But see Michael Dorf,
Toward a Doctrine of “Constitutionalish” Laws, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 17, 2012, 2:30 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/toward-doctrine-of-constitutionalish.html (suggesting
that structural remedies should be pragmatic and limited for “constitutionalish” laws,
whose fault is “technical”).
38. For examples of such scholarship, see generally Kent Barnett, Avoiding
Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349 (2012) [hereinafter
Barnett, Independent Agency]; Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s
Appointment with Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett,
Appointment with Trouble]; Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The
Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2011); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of
Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of StateGovernment Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602–03 (2012); Neomi
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541 (2011).
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Against this backdrop, I turn to three familiar values for
assessing the effectiveness of all remedies, including remedies for
systemic or structural defect: (1) compensation for and prospective
enforcement of the violation, (2) incentives to seek redress, and (3)
deterrence of violators. With these values in mind, I examine six
leading structural decisions to identify characteristics that often lead
structural remedies to achieve key remedial values.39 These
characteristics include requiring Congress or the President to
confront the structural defect and choose how to respond, providing
new administrative proceedings for the prevailing party after a court’s
ruling, and invalidating an agency’s actions taken while improperly
constituted.
In light of structural remediation’s deficiencies, courts have three
choices. First, they can alter structural remedies to correspond with
the Court’s description of substantive norms and regulated parties’
interest in vindicating them. To this end, I discuss possible remedial
reforms, most of which present their own difficulties. Second, courts
can candidly recognize that remedial limitations constrict the meaning
of an underlying safeguard. This option would allow regulated parties
to decide, with better information, whether structural protections are
worth vindicating. Finally, courts might reconsider a matter closely
related to the nature of the safeguard—whether regulated parties’
“personal rights” or “interests” in the enforcement of structural
safeguards should be less significant than the Court’s decisions, at
times, suggest. In particular, the sometimes awkward fit between
systemic harms and key remedial values for regulated parties reveals
that perhaps only the competing branches of government should be
able to enforce structural safeguards.
This Article is limited in four key ways. First, despite criticizing
the Court’s recent separation-of-powers cases elsewhere,40 I accept its
doctrine here. My purpose is to explore whether judicial remedies
under that doctrine provide insight into the true nature of structural
safeguards and how these remedies should be enforced. Second, my
inquiry, unlike those in related scholarship,41 considers regulated
39. The term “structural remedy” may connote injunctive relief in public-interest
litigation, such as with judicial remediation of racial discrimination through school busing
or of Eighth Amendment violations through judicial oversight of prison administration. I
use the term here to refer only to remedies to cure structural violations based upon
Articles II and III of the Constitution.
40. See, e.g., Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1350; Barnett,
Appointment with Trouble, supra note 38, at 1464–69.
41. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 16, at 906–10 (discussing the impact of judicial review
on the legislative branch).
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parties’ remedies through a theoretical lens that views a remedy’s
suitability primarily from a regulated party’s vantage point rather
than that of an affected branch of the federal government. I do not
assert that such a lens is the only or best way through which to view
these remedies; instead, it is a helpful yet overlooked tool for
illuminating the propriety of structural remedies. Other values—such
as limiting regulatory chaos and considering the proper role of the
courts, which I mention where relevant—are also important when
considering a remedy from other perspectives and defining the
structural safeguard. Third, I recognize the limited number of
structural challenges by regulated parties from which one can draw
conclusions. Nonetheless, it is better to consider existing decisions to
help improve remedies in this burgeoning area of litigation. Finally,
although I consider three possible responses to insufficient structural
remedies, I take no position as to the best response, leaving that issue
for another day. My purpose is only to spur courts, scholars, and
regulated parties to explore how inadequate structural remedies
impact underlying norms and to consider key options.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the
Supreme Court’s understanding of the three structural safeguards
that I consider in this Article: Appointments Clause limits,
presidential-supervision limits, and judicial-authority limits. Part II
explains why remedial theory matters for those safeguards and
considers the three key values that structural remedies should serve
for regulated parties. Part III considers the effectiveness of structural
remedies with regard to these critical desiderata in six decisions. Part
IV considers how courts and scholars could respond to limited
structural remedies.
I. CORE STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARDS
Most
constitutional
litigation
regarding
the
federal
administrative state concerns three safeguards: required methods of
appointment under the Appointments Clause, the President’s implied
power to remove executive officers under Article II, and the necessity
of judicial determination of disputed issues under Article III. This
Part briefly considers how the Court has approached each of these
safeguards and regulated parties’ relationships to them.
The Appointments Clause controls the installation of officers of
the United States.42 In effect, the clause separates appointees into two
groups: principal officers and inferior officers. Principal officers,
42. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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based on their lack of subordination to other officers and the
comparative importance of their duties,43 must be nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.44 Inferior officers must be
appointed in the same manner as principal officers or, at Congress’s
election, by the President alone, the heads of executive departments,
or the courts of law.45 The Supreme Court has stated that these
specific appointment mechanisms are not mere “etiquette or
protocol.”46 Instead, they act as a “bulwark against one branch
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch”47 and
“preserve[] . . . the Constitution’s structural integrity.”48 The clause
also prevents the distribution of the appointment power to numerous
officials, thereby helping ensure that identifiable individuals receive
the praise or blame for good or bad appointments.49
These limits on the appointment power inure to the benefit of
not only the branches of government but also regulated parties.50 Of
particular importance, the courts have resisted suggestions that only
the executive branch (or its own delegates) should be able to
challenge defective appointments through quo warranto
proceedings.51
43. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1997); see also Intercollegiate
Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1337–38 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(noting uncertainty under Supreme Court jurisprudence of whether proper inquiry
considers subordination and importance), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013)
(No. 12-928).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
45. Id.
46. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
47. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)). The power to appoint
heads of executive and independent agencies can be very meaningful. Professor Glen
Robinson has argued that independent agencies’ agendas “fit closely with presidential
programs in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations and yet did not require close
presidential control of the direction of agency decisions. Selective presidential
intervention through appointments . . . proved remarkably effective.” Glen O. Robinson,
Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative, 1988 DUKE L.J. 238,
250.
48. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
49. See id.
50. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182; see also Steven J. Duffield & James C. Ho, Comment,
The (Still) Illegal Appointment of Bill Lann Lee, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 403, 411 (1999)
(noting that appointments that require senatorial confirmation “protect[] citizens by
providing an added check against unwarranted government intrusion, ensuring that
individuals are not vested with the enormous power of the federal government unless
approved of by both the President and the Senate”).
51. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Kathryn
A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued Application, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1985) (“Andrade faults the de facto officer doctrine for
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Another key structural safeguard concerns the President’s power
to supervise executive officers. Although Article II says nothing
expressly about the President’s removal power,52 the Court has
understood the “executive power” to carry with it a measure of
presidential authority to remove executive officers, whether for any
reason or only for some form of good cause.53 The removal power is a
safeguard that prevents the diffusion of authority that “would greatly
diminish the intended and necessary responsibility of the chief
magistrate himself.”54 Indeed, the Court has referred to the
President’s supervisory powers over the administrative state as
“perhaps the key means” of preventing encroachment from the other
branches on executive authority.55
The class of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate the President’s
supervisory powers has been expanding. Officials whom the President
had removed have long brought, and prevailed in, challenges to the
President’s supervisory power by obtaining back pay.56 Members of
other branches of government, too, have prevailed in Article II-based
challenges to legislation.57 But more recently, regulated parties have

taking insufficient account of ‘the public interest in enforcing legal norms concerning
eligibility and appointment to office’ . . . .”). Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the
unanimous opinion in Andrade. See Andrade, 729 F.2d at 1478.
52. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3166 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258
(1839)); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.29 (1988).
53. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47.
54. Id. at 3164 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
55. Id. at 3157.
56. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 350–51, 356 (1958); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 619, 632 (1935). Presumably, the removed officer could
recover money damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012). See Tracey A.
Hardin, Note, Rethinking Independence: The Lack of an Effective Remedy for Improper
For-Cause Removals, 50 VAND. L. REV. 197, 200, 204 (1997). The remedy for an unlawful
removal—an award of back pay—generally satisfies the four remedial values. When an
officer is removed improperly, the President has failed to comply with an implied or
express statutory requirement that limits his or her removal power in a constitutional
manner. The monetary award can substantially compensate the removed officer and likely
provide sufficient incentive to litigate the matter if the compensation is significant. The
President’s improper removal can also lead to deterrence because of the political price
that the President may pay for the removal. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (noting how
“ ‘removal is a doomsday machine’ . . . for presidents” (quoting Paul R. Verkuil,
Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contracts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 943, 957 (1980))); accord Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s
Statutory Authority over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2477 (2011) (“[T]he
agency official retains leverage in a particular case to inflict political costs on the President
by resigning in protest or forcing the President to fire her.”).
57. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 (1986).
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brought challenges based on the President’s removal power.58 The
Court has not expressly stated that the President’s supervisory powers
exist to benefit regulated parties. It has, nonetheless, permitted
regulated parties to challenge restrictions upon the President’s
supervisory powers even in direct opposition to the government’s
position in litigation and recognized an implied right of action under
the Constitution to do so.59
Finally, the Court has moved to prevent incursions into the
judiciary’s own constitutional domain. Article III provides that “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish” and further provides salary protections
and presumptive life tenure for federal judges.60 The Court has
referred to separation of powers in the Article III context as “a
prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear distinctions
because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially
defensible in the heat of interbranch conflict.”61 These walls also serve
as an “inexorable command”62 to ensure that the judiciary is
independent from the other branches by not having to “curry[] favor”
with either the legislative or executive branch.63
Notwithstanding Article III’s protection for the courts, the Court
has emphasized that the article serves “primarily personal, rather
than structural, interests.”64 It achieves this goal by ensuring that
officials insulated from political pressures are assigned the power “to
say what the law is.”65 The Court has even spoken of regulated
parties’ interests as “personal right[s]” under Article III.66
58. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3146–47; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
659–60 (1988).
59. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151 n.2; cf. Krent, supra note 38, at 2438 (“The
President’s Article II powers of appointment and removal are designed not merely to
augment executive power, but to protect individual liberty.”); accord Harold J. Krent,
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 74 (1990); see also Bond v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“The structural principles secured by the separation of
powers protect the individual as well.”).
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
61. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (concerning legislation
that sought to reopen final judgments).
62. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
63. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011).
64. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
65. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
66. Schor, 478 U.S. at 848.
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The Court’s analytical methods reinforce the idea that all of
these safeguards are central to administrative structure. First, the
Court’s structural jurisprudence has relied increasingly upon formal
analysis,67 ignoring or minimizing functional critiques or problems
that Congress encounters when establishing administrative entities.68
The Court has indicated that formal rules provide prophylactic
devices that better protect the competing branches because functional
inquiries may lead courts to view transgressions, in isolation, as minor
or necessary under the seemingly urgent circumstances that surround
the particular structural innovation.69 By erecting formal doctrines,
the Court thereby ignores concerns (such as regulated parties’
“capture” of the administrative agencies that are meant to regulate
them70 or certain entities’ comparative subject-matter or other
administrative advantage71) that may have caused Congress to fashion
the administrative state in other ways. In short, the Court uses
formalism, in its view, to strengthen separation-of-powers safeguards
themselves at the expense of competing concerns.

67. See, e.g., Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1367–69 (discussing the
Court’s formalist analysis of the President’s removal power); Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note
38, at 1602; Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel:
Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 405 (2001) (noting a
more formal analytical turn under the Appointments Clause); Ralph Brubaker, Article
III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core
Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, Sept. 2011, at 1, 6 (2011) (discussing formal
analysis of Article III limits).
68. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3164–84 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (advocating against the formal view taken by
the Court); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759–75 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(discussing the formalistic view taken by the Court).
69. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 (“But the doctrine of separation of powers is a structural
safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied only when specific harm, or risk of specific
harm, can be identified. In its major features (of which the conclusiveness of judicial
judgments is assuredly one) it is a prophylactic device, establishing high walls and clear
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will not be judicially defensible in the
heat of interbranch conflict.”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1001 n.48 (2006) (collecting academic justifications
for formalism in separation-of-powers challenges, most of which turn on the importance of
having prophylactic protections).
70. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 614 (2010) (“Congress established the [PCAOB] as
an entity within an independent agency, the SEC, to avoid capture by the accounting
industry.”).
71. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2628–29 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that bankruptcy courts could constitutionally decide certain common-law claims
because, among other reasons, Congress could reasonably seek to allow more complete
resolution of debtors’ claims in centralized proceedings).
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Second, the irrelevance of the harmless error doctrine and the
use of counterfactual scenarios in structural litigation should render
judicial remediation of structural violations more likely and thereby
signify the structural safeguards’ importance. Courts can limit
remedies for constitutional violations by turning either to the
harmless error doctrine, which requires a showing of actual prejudice
for judicial remediation, or to likely counterfactual scenarios, which
consider whether the regulated party would likely be in the same
place even had no constitutional violation occurred. For instance,
before suppressing evidence for Fourth Amendment violations,
courts will consider both actual harm to the challenging criminal
defendant or counterfactuals to determine whether the police would
“inevitably” have legally discovered evidence that, in fact, was
illegally obtained.72 But the courts have held that these doctrines that
limit judicial remedies have little, if any, relevance to structural
violations.73 By ignoring questions of harm in the structural context,
the courts signal that a remedy should be more easily forthcoming for
structural violations. As I discuss in more detail in Part II.A, with the
availability of a more meaningful remedy comes a more meaningful
right.74
Yet, despite these safeguards’ exalted place in administrative and
constitutional law, courts have spent little time considering how to
remedy structural violations for regulated parties who assert
successful challenges. This lack of consideration may arise from the
unclear nature of regulated parties’ relationship with the structural
safeguards. In those rare instances when the Court describes the
regulated parties’ concern in the safeguard, it sometimes speaks of a
safeguard as establishing “personal rights”75 but other times refers to
personal “interests.”76 The Court has suggested (if not held) that
regulated parties have “implied private right[s] of action directly
72. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Nix v.
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 n.4 (1984)) (“We nonetheless affirm the admissibility of the
pager because it would inevitably have been lawfully discovered and, in any event, the
district court's denial of the motion to suppress the pager was harmless error.”).
73. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (rejecting the dissent’s functional
analysis); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184 n.4, 186 (1995); see also Landry v.
FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a showing of harm was not
required for a structural violation to exist); Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“The [Appointments] [C]lause would be a nullity if it could be assumed that
these very officials would in fact have been properly appointed and (especially) confirmed
by the Senate.”).
74. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 888; infra Part II.A.1.
75. See CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1996).
76. See id.
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under the Constitution . . . under the Appointments Clause or
separation-of-powers principles,” including the principles under
Article II, that entitle them to unspecified equitable relief.77 In the
context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,78 the Court has recognized a key
difference between “rights” and “interests” (or “benefits”) that
influences the availability of remedies in important ways.79 But the
Court has not explored whether there is a difference between “rights”
and “interests” in the separation-of-powers context and whether that
difference might have remedial consequences.
This Article does not seek to resolve the relationship between
regulated parties and structural safeguards. It refers to the regulated
parties’ concerns for structural safeguards or norms as “rights” and
“interests” interchangeably without intending for the terms to take on
some additional significance. The important point here is that the
Court has not paused to consider how constitutional rules that
address the relations of the branches of government intersect with
private parties who invoke these rules and with the remedies those
private parties seek. Yet considering the meaningfulness and
adaptability of structural remedies from the regulated party’s
perspective may inform the descriptive and normative nature of the
party’s interest in and relationship to the safeguards.
II. PROPER REMEDIES
Remedial considerations are important for two key reasons. The
first reason is obvious but often overlooked: remedies are what
litigants get in a concrete sense if their lawsuits are successful. Many
litigants may care only marginally, if at all, about the boundaries of
administrative structures or these structures’ effect on constitutional
or administrative law theory. But they do care about altering agency
structures in ways that further their own interests. The second reason
is that substantive norms and remedies are so closely bound together
that it is all but meaningless to consider one without the other.80
A. The Importance of Remedies
Scholars may view remedies as “the banausic sphere of policy,
pragmatism, and politics.”81 But litigants generally care only about

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151 n.2 (quoting the United States’ brief).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
See Levinson, supra note 32, at 857.
Id.
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substantive norms that have practical value to them. Without an
adequate remedy, a norm loses its value and is not worth
vindicating.82 For instance, the mere pronouncement of a norm
through a declaratory judgment may be less valuable than a
prohibitory injunction that limits administrative action, leaving
litigants less incentive to vindicate that norm. If affected parties have
no incentive to enforce a norm, that norm may cease to operate.
Remedies also give shape and meaning to substantive law. The
U.S. Constitution is nearly silent as to how courts or Congress should
remedy constitutional violations.83 This silence can be beneficial,
giving judges room to maneuver as they consider ideals that animate
constitutional rights and interests in a practical, political space. Yet it
also requires courts (and perhaps Congress) to accept the
responsibility of considering what makes a remedy proper. Remedies
become “the means by which the abstractions of the substantive law
are translated into concrete terms.”84
1. Rights and Remedies’ Interdependence
In examining certain constitutional civil rights, Professor Daryl
Levinson concluded that this translation does more than make
hortatory rhetoric comprehensible.85 Remedies, in his view, also
modify the meaning of norms or rights by narrowing or expanding
them.86 For instance, the Court’s early equal-protection decisions
after Brown v. Board of Education87 could be read as applying to de
jure and de facto discrimination. But the Court used remedies, such
as with school-busing schemes’ temporal length and geographic reach,
to limit an equal-protection right to de jure discrimination.88
Remedies may even come to define the right itself. For example,
faced with the vague Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and
unusual” punishment as applied to prison conditions, courts and
litigants have used past judicial remedies—such as limits on the
number of inmates housed in a room as established in a consent
decree—as constitutional benchmarks that apply to similar litigation,
82. See id. at 887 (referring to the “cash value of a right” as dependent on the
remedy).
83. See Hill, supra note 34, at 1118. One notable exception is the reference to habeas
corpus. See id. at 1118 n.42.
84. Wright, supra note 33, at 377; see also Levinson, supra note 32, at 858 (discussing
the relationship of rights and remedies).
85. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 873–74.
86. See id.
87. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
88. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 884–85.
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whereby it is “cruel and unusual” to exceed those numbers in the
future.89 This inversion of remedy and rights occurs because “the only
way to get a sense of which prison conditions are [cruel and unusual]
is to see what kinds of concrete changes are required by remedial
orders.”90 Because remedies can, in various ways, define substantive
norms, they are, to use Levinson’s term, in “equilibrium,” such that
neither is more important than the other.91
Of particular importance to the subject at hand is a critical point
about the right-remedy relationship: as remedies narrow in scope or
decrease in number, rights lose value to litigants who seek to enforce
them.92 Yet limiting remedies can have virtues. The Court, for
example, has understandably taken account of federalism, judicial
competence, and political resistance when fashioning constitutional
remedies.93 Using remedies to limit a right’s practical effect allows
courts to consider competing values and costs in achieving as much of
a remedy as is possible for a particular norm.94 In the administrative
context, for instance, courts can balance the need for litigating parties
to have incentives to seek redress against either the chaos that could
arise from entirely stopping an agency from functioning or concerns
about judicial competence in redesigning arms of the federal
government.95 The balancing of such competing considerations may
also permit courts to expand remedies later as practical realities
change.96
Expanding remedies also alters rights, but not necessarily in ways
that litigants would prefer. Although an expansive remedy may seek
to ensure that an underlying norm is fully vindicated, such a remedy
can lead to underenforcement of substantive norms.97 A remedy that
is too powerful may face legitimate or illegitimate resistance or
demand such an investment of judicial resources that courts avoid
finding a violation in the first place.98 For instance, courts could
invalidate entire agencies—such as the SEC—based on structural
89. See id. at 879–80.
90. Id. at 880.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 888; see also Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837
(2004) (“Nonetheless, the danger [that an expanded right may ultimately become less
available] may be inherent in every attempt to expand a right, for at some point, as the
definition of a right is enlarged, there are likely to be reasons for qualifying access.”).
93. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 589–628; Levinson, supra note 32, at 873–84.
94. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377–81.
95. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 598–608.
96. See id.
97. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 866–70.
98. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 589–91.
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deficiencies. But aware of the practical chaos that such a remedy
would create, courts would likely narrow the underlying structural
safeguard so as to rarely find a violation.99
2. Rights and Remedies’ Independence
Despite the importance of the relationship between rights and
remedies, Levinson’s remedial-equilibrium paradigm may be less
salient in the context of structural challenges to the federal
administrative state. Oftentimes these structural challenges are based
on more formally defined rights than those imposed by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to which Levinson refers. For
instance, the Appointments Clause requires that principal officers be
appointed in one way and that inferior officers be appointed in one of
four ways.100 Although there is uncertainty over, say, the nature of a
department or an officer, the nature of the constitutional requirement
is relatively clear because the Constitution provides exactly how the
appointment must occur.101 Likewise, the Court has come to express
the nature of the President’s supervisory powers in formal terms
based on the kind of protections that an executive-branch officer has
from the President’s (or other officer’s) at-will removal.102 The
boundaries of required executive supervision often fluctuate within
the Court’s jurisprudence, but the constitutional requirement can be
stated in relatively clear terms of protection from at-will removal.
Unlike the scenarios that Levinson considers, the presence of a
structural violation, as opposed to its importance, can be established
without regard to the remedy: whether that remedy is the invalidation
of the agency itself, invalidation of a specific agency action, or
invalidation of the offending statutory provision.
Thinking of rights and remedies as independent concepts103 can
also be practical and allow legislatures room to address remedial

99. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 889, 913; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing how
courts have limited the Article III safeguard as it applies to agencies).
100. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; supra text accompanying notes 42–45.
101. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
102. See generally Barnett, Independent Agency, supra note 38, at 1367–69 (discussing
the Court’s formalist analysis of the President’s removal power and the importance of the
language in protections from removal).
103. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 736 (1917) (“Whether he can make the seizure
himself . . . may be important as to remedy, but does not affect his ultimate and essential
right.”).
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concerns.104 Certain scholars have sought to separate a right from its
remedy to ensure that courts have full power to define rights à la
Marbury v. Madison105 while recognizing Congress’s power to help
define suitable remedies.106 They recognize that creating remedies
requires balancing different interests, including fiscal and
administrative costs that have a significance that is independent from
the norm itself.107 Fact-bound remedial considerations such as these
may be more suitable for legislatures than courts.108
This insight is important because it recognizes that Congress can
and should play a role in fashioning remedies. As Professor (and
former Acting U.S. Solicitor General) Walter Dellinger has argued in
the context of Fourth Amendment violations, the means of enforcing
“constitutional right[s] should be left with Congress unless, in the
absence of judicial action, the right in question would be so wanting
of remedies as to render it a mere form of words.”109 Rights can be
realized in different ways, each with its own set of costs, effectiveness,
and symbolic consequences. As explained below,110 viewing Congress
as a partner in structural remediation (and consequently defining the
safeguard) may provide useful play in the joints as structural remedies
are fitted to structural constitutional violations.
B.

Key Remedial Values

Although “a perfect remedy is a frequent illusion,”111 a remedy
can qualify as “good” only if it responds to relevant underlying
values.112 In the context of structural remediation, however, courts
and scholars have often failed to consider values that the remedy
104. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753, 757 (2012)
(noting that Levinson’s theory can be useful but “overwhelm[ing]” and limiting its
application for purposes of his thesis).
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
106. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 678.
107. See Dellinger, supra note 34, at 1556.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 1536 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. See infra Part IV.A.3.
111. Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591–92.
112. Cf. Wright, supra note 33, at 386 (recognizing that courts should look past the
technical rules of legal and equitable remedies and instead consider the “relevant social
policies”). Professor Wright identified five remedial principles or purposes that remedies
are intended to serve. See id. at 377–80. But these purposes or principles, in some
instances, are instead merely descriptions of the nature of the remedy. For instance, he
identifies a schedule of remedies as a purpose. Id. But a schedule of remedies—in which a
statute provides the proper consideration for the violation of different rights or harms—is
a kind of remedial scheme that may have many purposes, such as punishment, deterrence,
and compensation. Id.
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should attempt to satisfy.113 Those values are mentioned, if at all, only
in passing.114 Or the court articulates “a rather variable application of
the vague equitable maxim that ‘the nature of the . . . remedy is to be
determined by the nature and scope of the violation’ ”115 or it states
that “rights should find vindication in an effective remedy.”116
To consider the success and failings of remedies for separationof-powers violations, I consider the three remedial values I have
encountered most in scholarship and case law concerning remedies
for individual parties: (1) compensation for past harm (and a related
sub-value of prospective enforcement of the norm), (2) incentives to
seek redress of a violated norm, and (3) deterrence of future
violations.117 I turn to private-law remedial practice (and certain
public-law remedies) to put structural remedies in context and to
suggest how structural remedies for prevailing regulated parties can
be viewed as succeeding or failing. I do not contend here that
remedies should work exactly the same way in all private- and publiclaw contexts or that no other considerations—such as regulatory
chaos or separation-of-powers concerns—are relevant. Indeed, I
recognize that these three most significant, traditional remedial
values for private parties often rest awkwardly with structural
remedies, suggesting that satisfactory remedies might be difficult to
fashion and thus that courts should perhaps reconsider the nature of
the underlying safeguards.118
1. Compensation for Past Harm and Prospective Enforcement
Perhaps the most important remedial values are compensation
for past harm and prospective enforcement. I discuss these values
113. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591; Wright, supra note 33, at 376–81.
114. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 591.
115. Nagel, supra note 34, at 712.
116. Sturm, supra note 31, at 1378.
117. Other remedial values include personal vindication of the right, punishment, or
restitution (focusing on the return of wrongful profits, not compensation for loss). See
DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 135–37 (1st ed. 1973). As I
suggest later, punishment is not likely a relevant value in most structural contexts. See
infra note 203. Likewise, personal vindication, in my view, is tied to litigation incentive and
compensation. The mere pronouncement of a right may have some value (especially for
certain dignitary harms), but it is almost certainly less valuable (and vindicated less fully)
than an infringed right for which the law gives a more meaningful remedy. See DOBBS,
supra, at 135 (referring to the use of nominal damages to vindicate “technical right[s]”).
Vindication, therefore, has little value in and of itself and rarely occurs without the other
values’ presence. I have also not considered restitution here because of the difficulty of
valuing how the government or a particular branch of government has “profited” from a
structural defect. My focus is on the prevailing party’s injury.
118. See infra Part IV.C.
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together in this Section because of their close relationship to one
another in the structural context. Prospective enforcement through
injunctive relief is, of course, common in public-law litigation and
provides the prevailing party, in most cases, with either some
substantive benefit or procedures that are more likely than structural
reforms to influence an agency’s substantive decision.119 Money
damages, however, are conspicuously absent in most constitutional
challenges against the federal government, thereby limiting
compensation to a prevailing party for past harm.120 Courts,
nonetheless, can partially achieve both of these values in the
structural context without money damages by attempting to
compensate through equitable relief.121
Compensation for an inflicted injury is likely the most familiar
purpose of legal remedies.122 Compensation can take different forms
but generally manifests itself through money damages.123 In tort law,
money damages are typically tied to harm to property, medical bills,
pain and suffering, lost wages or profits, and the like.124
Compensatory money damages for breach of contract usually look to
expectation damages, which are based on what the non-breaching
party expected to receive from a performed contract.125 The
underlying notion is that monetary damages in both contexts will
make the victim whole, meaning that the law—to the extent
possible—places the victim in the place where he or she would have

119. See infra Part II.B.2. For example, many procedural challenges will concern
parties’ rights under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
These procedural challenges could be based upon the failure of the agency to engage in
required notice-and-comment rulemaking, see id. § 553(b)(3), the failure of the agency to
provide sufficient notice for a proposed rule, see id. § 553(b), the failure of the agency to
provide a sufficient explanation of a final rule’s basis and purpose, see id. § 553(c), or the
failure of the agency to abide by the procedural requirements for formal adjudication, see
id. §§ 554, 556. The agency’s failure to abide by these procedural requirements can
indicate a failure to obtain or consider relevant comments or testimony. The agency’s
failure to do so can lead to a different outcome. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755
F.2d 1098, 1106–07 (4th Cir. 1985) (invalidating an agency rule that sought to prohibit
beneficiaries of the Women, Infants and Children Program (“WIC”) from purchasing
chocolate milk because of inadequate notice to interested parties); see also U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Benefits and Services: WIC Food Package, FOOD & NUTRITION SERVICE,
http://www.fns.usda.gov/wic/benefitsandservices/former-foodpkgmilkfaqs.HTM
(last
visited Dec. 28, 2013) (noting that chocolate milk continues to be WIC-eligible).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 128–46.
121. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377–78.
122. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 592; Wright, supra note 33, at 377.
123. See Wright, supra note 33, at 377.
124. See DOBBS, supra note 117, at 540–51.
125. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 730–33 (4th ed. 2004).
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been had no violation or breach occurred.126 Constitutional litigation,
too, often focuses on compensatory values in the context of § 1983
litigation and actions brought directly under the Constitution itself.127
No matter how uncomfortably the compensation value rests
within constitutional challenges generally, it may rest even less
comfortably within structural litigation for two main reasons. First, a
prevailing party’s loss caused by a structural defect may be difficult to
value, which renders compensation difficult to achieve.128 Assume, for
instance, that a regulated party against which an agency has
successfully asserted an enforcement proceeding demonstrates that
the agency is not sufficiently subject to the President’s supervision.
The pecuniary damage to the regulated party is difficult to measure
because it seeks to quantify the harm caused by having an agency that
was not sufficiently accountable to the President. Perhaps one should
envision a world in which a properly supplicant agency would or
would not have brought an enforcement proceeding or taken some
other action because of either differing discretion or changes to the
substantive regulatory policy. But numerous scholars have questioned
the practical significance of the President’s power to remove
officers,129 rendering it speculative to suggest that a properly
supervised agency would have acted any differently. If so, the injury
to the regulated party is difficult to discern and, like emotional
harms,130 difficult to measure in monetary terms. This is not to say
that all other public-law or even private-law harms are easy to value.
But structural challenges will almost always present valuation and

126. See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (2005); DOBBS, supra note 117, at 136 (“[T]he main purpose
of the damages award is some rough kind of compensation for the plaintiff’s loss.”);
Wright, supra note 33, at 377 (describing the “indemnity” or compensation principle).
127. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, The Right–Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1999); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 690
(1978) (permitting compensatory awards for a municipality’s violation of constitutional
rights that are based on the municipality’s policy or custom and overruling contrary
holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
128. See Bray, supra note 104, at 763 (citing Ronen Avaraham, Putting a Price on Painand-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal
for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 94–96 & n.43 (2006)).
129. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 56, at 30; Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets
Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 480–81 (2010); Jonathan L. Entin,
Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1595, 1601–02 (1997); Jonathan L. Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit:
Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 777–81 (1987); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2273–74 (2001).
130. See Phillips v. Hunter Trails Cmty. Ass’n, 685 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“Injuries [for mental and emotional distress] are by their nature difficult to prove.”).
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causation difficulties even if, as in the case of emotional harms, those
difficulties can sometimes be overcome.
Second, even if one presumes that the agency would not have
taken a certain action in the absence of a structural defect, the case
for pecuniary damages may be weaker than in other contexts because
the judiciary, as in many other public-law contexts, can prevent much
of the harm by providing prospective enforcement with an injunction.
Agencies will typically require regulated parties to take particular
actions, such as paying a fine or discontinuing a business practice. The
court can avoid much of any resulting harm by staying or invalidating
the agency’s order or other action.131 By preventing the injury from
occurring and enforcing the norm prospectively, the Court may
render compensation for past harm less important.132
For any harm that remains uncompensated, a monetary remedy
does not likely exist, whether the structural violations are deemed
analogous to tort or contract. Although Congress has ensured under
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that a litigant can seek
“relief other than money damages” against an agency and its

131. Indeed, invalidating an agency order or rule is the most typical remedy for an
overreaching agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). This is true whether the defect is
procedural, see David B. Chaffin, Note, Remedies for Noncompliance with Section 553 of
the Administrative Procedure Act: A Critical Evaluation of United States Steel and
Western Oil & Gas, 1982 DUKE L.J. 461, 464–65 (“Most courts sustaining such procedural
challenges immediately invalidate the rule and remand the case to the agency with
instructions to follow proper section 553 procedures.”); id. at 465 n.23 (“Most courts use
this remedy [of invalidation and remand] as a matter of course, seemingly without
considering whether alternatives are available.”), or substantive, see Glen Staszewski,
Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model to Direct
Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 395 (2003) (“When an agency fails to engage in
reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process, courts must invalidate the final
rule and remand the matter to the agency for further consideration.”).
132. To be sure, the regulated party likely incurred significant legal fees in regulatory
investigations and proceedings. See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809,
811–12 (1994). Yet, despite some exceptions in administrative matters, courts typically
ignore these costs as merely part of doing business or of living in a society with a
functioning judiciary (and administrative state). See id. at 809; Gregory C. Sisk, The
Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 233–34 (1995) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1988)) (noting that the Equal Access to Justice Act permits recovery
of attorneys’ fees if the government’s position is not substantially justified); Gregory C.
Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for
Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1, 191–200 (1995) (citing
Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—A Qualified Success,
11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458, 500 (1993)) (noting the rarity of EAJA awards and limited
effectiveness of the statute at realizing remedial purposes); John P. Stern, Note, Applying
the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459, 1464 (1989)
(noting that awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA are rare).
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officials,133 Congress has generally retained its sovereign immunity
from suits seeking monetary damages.134 The two significant statutes
in which Congress has waived its sovereign immunity—the Federal
Tort Claims Act135 for tort claims and the Tucker Act136 for contract
claims—are almost certainly inapplicable to nearly all regulated
parties that assert structural challenges.137
Likewise, the courts have not created a cause of action for money
damages against agency officials directly under the Constitution for
structural violations. The Court has created direct causes of action
under the Constitution in limited circumstances. In Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,138 the Court
created a direct cause of action against federal officials who violate
the Fourth Amendment.139 Although Bivens focused on the Fourth
Amendment, a “Bivens action” has come to refer to all actions for
money damages brought directly under the Constitution.140 The Court
has created Bivens actions under the Fifth Amendment141 and the
Eighth Amendment.142 But the Court has since responded cautiously
“to suggestions that Bivens be extended into new contexts.”143 In
particular, the Court unanimously refused to create a Bivens action
against federal agencies themselves.144
133. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
134. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 614–16 (4th ed. 2003).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
136. Id. at § 1346.
137. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (citing United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing
the Tucker Act)), overruled by United States v. Tohono O’Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723
(2011), as stated in U.S. Home Corp. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 191, 194 (Fed. Cl.
2012); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 621 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 27 (1953) (discussing the Federal Tort Claims Act)).
138. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
139. Id. at 389.
140. See Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Note, Grosh v. Ramirez, the Warranty Requirement,
and Qualified Immunity, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1179, 1182 n.30 (2004).
141. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979).
142. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 (1980). The Court has assumed, but never
held, that a Bivens action may be grounded in the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)).
143. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 422 (1988).
144. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). In Meyer, a federal agency
terminated Meyer from his position as an officer of a failing thrift institution. Id. at 473.
Meyer asserted several claims, including a putative Bivens claim against the federal agency
(and a federal officer) for due process violations. See id. at 474, 484. The Supreme Court
held that Bivens actions are not cognizable against the federal agencies because: Bivens
itself was an action against federal officers, see id. at 484–85; the extension of Bivens
actions against an agency would allow parties to make an end-run around qualified
immunity doctrines that protect federal officers, see id. at 485; and the threat of Bivens

CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 481

506

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92

A Bivens action, moreover, may make little sense in a structuralchallenge context. The Court has stated that it will not extend Bivens
when Congress has created an alternate, equally effective resolution
mechanism or when other “special factors counsel[] hesitation.”145
“Special factors” (despite being ill-defined in case law) likely exist
structural-challenge context. First, structural defects, by their very
nature, usually infect the entire agency and thereby affect numerous
agency actions and actors as opposed to a specific action, policy, or
actor. Second, because a structural defect is usually not created by the
agency itself or its actors, the agency officials should not be personally
responsible (even if later indemnified by the federal government) for
compensating the wronged party. Unlike other Bivens claims based
on individual rights within the Bill of Rights, structural defects do not
involve legal principles that often come into conflict with day-to-day
agency actions, and thus the agency official would have little reason
to be familiar with the nature of structural limitations. This is so
because it is Congress (usually with the support of the President) that
creates the agencies and any resulting structural defect. Given a
Bivens action’s close relationship to tort, the extension of Bivens to
structural challenges would ignore the identity of the analogous
tortfeasor and the causation between the putative tortfeasor’s action
and the inflicted harm.146
Despite the absence of a cause of action for money damages,
courts can still validate the compensatory interest in other, albeit
perhaps less complete and conventional, ways. Equitable relief, such
as specific performance, can provide not only prospective
enforcement but also compensation even in the tort context.147 For
actions unadorned by qualified immunity would lead to “a potentially enormous financial
burden for the Federal Government.” Id. at 486.
145. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395–97 (1971). The
Court has provided little guidance as to the “special factors,” but it has denied Bivens
actions when Congress has established alternative remedial mechanisms or the claims
arise from military service. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 134, at 600–04. Likewise, in
Meyer, the Court deemed the potentially “enormous financial burden for the Federal
Government” that could arise from allowing Bivens actions directly against federal
agencies as a “special factor[] counselling hesitation.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486 (internal
citation omitted).
146. Cf. Hill, supra note 34, at 1137. If a Bivens action did lie, the official would not
likely be able to rely on immunity defenses. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809
(1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 523 (1978). Qualified immunity, typically
available to administrative officials, is available only to discretionary decisions. See
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Whether an agency is established properly does not involve a
discretionary decision on the part of an agency official. See id.
147. See Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L. REV. 877, 908 (1990);
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979).
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instance, in a car-accident case in which the plaintiff suffered only
property damage, a court could require the defendant to have the
plaintiff’s car repaired instead of requiring the defendant to pay
money damages.148 Having the car repaired can make the plaintiff
substantially whole in the same way as money can. Specific
performance may also be very useful in an imperfect world by
providing a compensatory remedy when valuation is difficult.149
Certain forms of equitable relief that are analogous to specific
performance can serve a similar purpose in structural-defect cases.
The most common remedy for unconstitutional action is injunctive
relief to provide prospective enforcement of an underlying norm.150
As part of the equitable relief, a court faced with a structural defect
could—and sometimes does151—go further by requiring a wholly new
proceeding, investigation, or other action before or by a properly
established agency.152 A new proceeding before a properly configured
agency compensates in part. As with a specific-performance remedy
for breach of contract, the regulated party obtains all to which it was
entitled under the “contract” between citizen and government that is
the U.S. Constitution. Likewise, as with analogous tort remedies (for
example, the return of an item that has been converted by the
defendant), the regulated party is returned to substantially the same
position that the party would have been in had the government not
“wronged” the regulated party by establishing a structurally defective
agency.153 The new proceeding ensures that the party receives the

148. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 117, at 135; Wright, supra note 33, at 378.
149. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 125, at 747–48.
150. See Preis, supra note 35, at 1–3.
151. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3161–62 (2010); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332,
1342 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) (No. 12-928).
152. Perhaps sovereign immunity prohibits courts from awarding some form of specific
performance or other injunctive relief, such as when the relief sought is equivalent to
monetary damages. See Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 554 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2009). But courts have awarded analogous relief
when Congress has violated the Appointments Clause, see infra Part III, and, despite the
general applicability of sovereign immunity, the Courts have a long history of awarding
various forms of injunctive relief that may address the effects of past violations, see, e.g.,
Preis, supra note 35, at 43–44, 48–50.
153. Although it is true that the prevailing party does not recover any compensation
for attorneys’ fees and other expenses that it incurred because of the actions taken by a
structurally defective agency, these expenses are, as discussed above, those that the law
generally does not deem compensable. See supra note 132. In the structural context, as in
other constitutional challenges against the federal government, the equitable remedies can
compensate only in part.
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structural safeguard’s protection for all portions of an agency’s
decision-making process.
If, in contrast, the court does not require new proceedings, but
instead only “cure[s]” future proceedings through the issuance of
exclusively forward-looking injunctive relief,154 the remedy may
prevent some future harm by enforcing the norm prospectively. But
the remedy does not give the prevailing party that to which it was
entitled in the first instance. It also does not stop any “tainted fruit”
of the initial, defective proceedings from infecting future proceedings.
Instead, future harms based on past structural defects may
significantly affect regulated parties so long as the court gives the
agency’s past actions de facto validity. For example, a judicial remedy
that provides de facto validity to the past actions of unconstitutionally
installed officers but otherwise forbids the agency from promulgating
future regulations or holding future adjudications—an actual remedy
that the Court has employed155—would not compensate for past
violations or even prevent those future harms that flow from a
structurally defective administrative entity’s past actions.
To be sure, courts often ignore or fail to fulfill the compensatory
value when the United States has acted in an unconstitutional manner
even outside the structural context. Based on prudential concerns, for
example, courts provide only prospective injunctive relief to stop an
ongoing constitutional or statutory violation, preventing future harm
but not rectifying past wrongs.156 But, as is relevant to the other two
values discussed below, the prevailing party obtains something
substantive and meaningful in most non-structural cases (whether
based on constitutional or administrative law). For example, the
agency may be required to ignore a particular criterion, treat certain
regulated parties similarly, or engage in certain procedures. These
requirements can, but do not always, affect the agency’s final decision
and thereby are meaningful to the prevailing party. And even if
compensation is uncommon in non-structural challenges, the failure
to provide past compensatory relief is a recurring criticism of
constitutional-remedial doctrine,157 a criticism that courts—through

154. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184–86 (1995).
155. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the structural remedy in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)).
156. See Preis, supra note 35, at 1–3.
157. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1427 (1987) (“Whenever [governments] do act unconstitutionally, they must in some way
undo the violation by ensuring that victims are made whole. In many cases, only
governmental liability can provide this assurance.”); see also Jeffries, supra note 127, at

CITE AS 92 N.C. L. REV. 481

2014]

TO THE VICTOR GOES THE TOIL

509

Bivens actions, school-busing cases seeking to eradicate “effects” of
segregation, and affirmative-action cases—have oftentimes responded
to in a robust way.158 In short, remedies for other constitutional
violations do not establish that the compensatory value is irrelevant
or unnecessary, only that it is often not fully realized.
2. Incentives to Pursue Redress
Meaningful remedies should provide wronged parties with
incentives to enforce their interests159 because otherwise the
underlying norm has no traction in the real world.160 In one of its
more recent structural-defect decisions, the Supreme Court
recognized that a remedy must provide sufficient incentive to litigate
structural challenges.161 Without such an incentive, the wronged party
will be unlikely to seek to vindicate the interest that the Court seeks
to safeguard.
This is so even if the remedy is fully compensatory for an
individual litigant. If the right or norm’s value is lower than the cost
of asserting the claim or if the remedy does little to advance the
litigant’s related interests, the rational litigant will not bother to assert
that interest.162 For instance, much of the debate over the lawfulness
of class-action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements centers on
the problem of ensuring that consumers have incentive to assert a
fully compensated right.163 An arbitration agreement may well
provide full compensation for a breach-of-contract or tort claim in

87–88 (discussing the contributions of Amar and other scholars to the discussion of
remedies).
158. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J.)
(directing admission of a Caucasian student to medical school); Christopher J. Peters,
Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1515 n.254 (2000)
(referring to Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1971)).
159. See Daniel M. Filler, Silence and the Racial Dimension of Megan’s Law, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 1535, 1589 (2004).
160. See Angela C. Zambrano, Robert Velevis & Kent Barnett, Wavering Over
Consumer Class Actions, 12 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., Dec. 2008, at 4, 6
(considering consumers’ incentive to litigate low-value claims); cf. Ann C. McGinley &
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Condescending Contradictions: Richard Posner’s Pragmatism &
Pregnancy Discrimination, 46 FLA. L. REV. 193, 254 n.443 (1994) (noting, in corrective
justice terms, incentive problems in rendering low-value discrimination claims difficult to
assert).
161. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183, 186 (1995).
162. See supra note 160.
163. See, e.g., Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (en banc)
(citing cases), abrogated on preemption grounds by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011), as recognized in Coneff v. AT&T, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012).
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arbitration proceedings.164 However, if full compensation is relatively
small and less than the financial and opportunity costs of asserting the
legal claim, the wronged party will likely not bother to assert the
right. As Judge Posner has colorfully stated, “only a lunatic or a
fanatic sues over $30.”165
The lack of incentive may be less obvious in the case of regulated
corporate parties. Regulated parties, for example, often have
incentives to litigate because they have better access to the judicial
system than consumers, and, given their typically long-term
relationship and repeat-player status with agencies, they stand to
suffer or gain more from any particular judicial or administrative
decision.166 But limited remedies and frequent interaction with
agencies sometimes encourage timidity in challenging administrative
structure. Public-choice theory as applied in the regulatory context,
after all, suggests that regulated repeat players will not want to risk
offending the same officials whose cooperation and favor they may
need in the future.167 To be sure, many officials’ professionalism or
unawareness of the proceedings may prevent them from becoming
hostile, and any particular official’s response is usually a matter of
speculation. But the uncertain reaction of any particular agency
official will itself be a variable in the litigation calculus of regulated
parties who interact frequently with a particular administrative
agency. In fact, a regulated party who challenged the CFPB on
separation-of-powers grounds expressed its fears that parties who
challenge the CFPB’s constitutionality face the threat of the CFPB
bringing a retaliatory enforcement action.168 Moreover, other scholars
164. See id. at 1007.
165. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
166. See John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural “Reform”: In
Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 608 (2003).
167. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
636 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1682–83 (1975). The meaning of “public choice theory” is
notoriously “supple.” Cynthia R. Farina, Faith, Hope, and Rationality or Public Choice
and the Perils of Occam’s Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109, 115 n.16 (2000). I use the
term here merely to refer to an economic understanding of agency motivation, which often
considers relationships among various actors, including the agencies themselves, in
administrative and legislative decision-making. See KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008).
168. See Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, 2013 WL 5664696, at *7
(D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2013). The CFPB had been investigating Morgan Drexen and advised that
it was considering an enforcement action. Morgan Drexen then filed its constitutional
challenge, and the CFPB in turn filed its enforcement action in another jurisdiction. See id.
at *2–3. The court found Morgan Drexen’s fears “exaggerate[ed],” and it presumed that
the CFPB’s “enforcement actions are brought in good faith.” Id. at *7.
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have noted a similar phenomenon in the context of judicial
disqualification motions, where parties are hesitant to question an
adjudicator’s impartiality, even where a strong case for establishing a
conflict of interest exists.169
Moreover, a regulated party’s incentive to assert a structural
challenge may be meaningfully different from a regulated party’s
incentive to assert a substantive, policy-based challenge under the
APA. If, for example, a successful structural challenge results only in
formal changes to the agency’s design, the potential reward for a
successful challenge is hard to define ex ante and perhaps not
meaningful to the regulated party’s substantive goals. This same
successful challenge to the officials’ very legitimacy may also lead to a
risk of offending these officials and causing them, consciously or not,
to be uncooperative in future regulatory matters with the litigant. The
regulated party may find the risk-and-reward calculus more favorable
with a traditional challenge to agency action under the APA. A
successful challenge under the APA is more likely than a structural
challenge to provide remedies that alter a substantive administrative
action without offending agency officials. For APA challenges, the
agency’s and officials’ legitimacy does not come into question—only
the specific action does. For example, the candidates in Buckley could
have challenged the FEC’s specific election-finance rulings (assuming
that they were otherwise suitable for judicial review), had orders or
rules set aside under the APA as “arbitrary or capricious,” and
returned to any ongoing or future agency proceedings with a clearer
understanding of the governing substantive law.170 These kinds of
substantive challenges to agency action are routine under the APA
and do not involve challenges to an agency’s very legitimacy. The
regulated party, therefore, has more incentive to bring the APA
challenge.
Of course, substantive or procedural challenges to agency action
will not always lead to a new result,171 but the odds are better than
with a structural challenge. The agency may, upon remand, come to
the same conclusion, although this time after a permissible process or

169. See, e.g., Michelle T. Friedland, Disqualification or Suppression: Due Process and
the Response to Judicial Campaign Speech, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 563, 614 (2004); Tobin A.
Sparling, Keeping Up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct’s Prohibition on Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of Bias, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 441, 479–80 (2006).
170. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
171. See Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of
Equitable Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 188 (2011).
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upon a reasoned basis.172 But the judiciary’s rejection of agency
reasoning or procedures makes it more likely that an agency may
adjust its policy, given that regulated parties likely obtain more
control in the next round of administrative proceedings by obtaining
more procedures (which provides time to organize any regulatory
allies) or taking off the table certain arguments that the agency relied
upon in past proceedings. A structural challenge, in contrast, may
lead to new proceedings, but the agency—even if not offended by the
structural challenge—does not need to use different reasoning or
procedures to reach the prior result or continue its course of action.173
To be sure, political pressures may, at least theoretically, increase or
decrease after the structural alteration to the agency, affecting the
administrative action.174 Yet their existence or effect is difficult to
determine in advance, and it may be that the regulated party cannot
control them.
3. Deterrence
Remedies that compensate and incentivize the wronged party
usually also deter violation of private- and public-law rights.175
Indeed, deterrence from such a remedy may be at its zenith when the
damages are less certain and potentially very substantial.176 But

172. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 200–06 (1947).
173. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 188 (1995).
174. The political pressures could properly increase or decrease, depending on the
nature of the structural change. Because the Appointments Clause is intended to hold an
appointing official politically accountable usually to the President and perhaps the Senate,
see Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)), requiring
new administrative action through a properly appointed official may increase the political
nature of a particular agency decision. Likewise, an agency official who loses protections
from removal may, at least theoretically, be subject to additional political persuasion by
the President or other executive-branch officials. See supra text accompanying notes 46–
55. But political pressures could properly decrease if a court decides that an Article III
court—whose judges have numerous protections from political influence—must decide a
certain matter instead of an administrative agency. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594,
2609 (2011). Or, similarly, political pressure could decrease if a court determines that an
agency has implied statutory protection from the President’s at-will removal. See Wiener
v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1958).
175. See Dellinger, supra note 34, at 1553; Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 592; Wright, supra
note 33, at 381.
176. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 49
(2008); Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1405–06 (1987). But see Gregory Klass, Contracting for
Cooperation in Recovery, 117 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2007) (concluding, in the context of
compensatory damages for breach of contractual terms meant to aid in any recovery, that
“unliquidated compensatory damages for obstructive breach will, in many cases, do little
or nothing to deter the promisor who would otherwise obstruct recovery”).
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remedies that compensate and incentivize will not (and perhaps
should not, in certain contexts) always deter. For example, providing
expectation damages may compensate a non-breaching party to a
contract, and the damages—if sufficiently large—may provide
sufficient incentive for that party to seek redress. Yet those significant
damages, especially if liquidated and thus certain, may not deter the
breaching party when the breach is economically efficient.177
Likewise, even tortfeasors may determine the efficiency of a breached
duty, as Ford’s infamous cost-benefit memo in the “Pinto Case”
attests.178 Thus for the law to deter, it may need to provide other
familiar remedies, such as punitive,179 scheduled,180 or treble
damages.181 Non-pecuniary remedies might also be developed, such as

177. Of course, for adherents of efficient breach, breach is not an undesirable event.
Instead, it is merely one of two permissible choices, based on economic benefits: (1)
perform under the contract or (2) breach and pay damages to the other party while
entering into another, more profitable contract. See William J. Woodward, Jr.,
Contractarians, Community, and the Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV.
1103, 1138 (1996). If the breach is not undesirable, then deterrence has no place. See
Wright, supra note 33, at 379. But structural safeguards in the Constitution do not present
a choice between two economic alternatives; instead, they are prophylactic rules that seek
to prevent the gradual usurpation of one branch’s power by another and to create the
proper political incentives for governmental officers. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,
514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (discussing separation of powers); supra Part I. The Constitution,
in other words, has already established the undesirable nature of certain administrative
schemes, rendering deterrence a potentially germane value for an appropriate remedy.
178. See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–17 & n.80 (1982). In the
memo, Ford calculated that the cost of victim injuries and deaths from not using safer fuel
tanks was less than the cost of modifying its cars to include safer fuel tanks. Id. As
Professor Owen argues, the tortfeasor’s utilitarian considerations laid the basis for
punitive damages, the purpose of which was to punish Ford and deter similar future
conduct. Id. at 20–28. Compensatory damages—even if uncertain and significant—did not
deter Ford’s action. Id.
179. This is not to say that these other remedies, including even punitive damages,
necessarily accomplish the goal of deterrence. See DOBBS, supra note 117, at 220.
180. See Bray, supra note 104, at 756–57 (recognizing the deterrent effect of scheduled
damages that are excessive).
181. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“The
very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful
conduct . . . .”); John R. Harrison, Jr., Comment, The Deceptive Trade Practices—
Consumer Protection Act: The Shield Becomes the Sword, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 879, 915
n.222 (1986). Treble damages can also serve as a means of providing incentive to litigants
to seek redress. See G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—
Is This the End of RICO?”, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 912–13 n.166 (1990) (considering
RICO); Christina L. Goshaw, Note, Tomilson v. Camel City Motors, Inc.: The North
Carolina Supreme Court’s Hybrid Solution to Surety Liability Under General Statutes
Section 75–16, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1959, 1977 (1992).
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the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.182
For structural-defect challenges, deterrence-based judicial
remedies may be difficult to formulate. First, the sovereign-immunity
doctrine limits the ability of courts to provide pecuniary remedies
whether they are meant to compensate or deter.183 Indeed, Congress
is even more unlikely to waive (and courts much less likely to find a
waiver of) the government’s sovereign immunity from punitive
damages.184 Second, deterrence-driven non-pecuniary remedies may
be unnecessarily destructive to the administrative state, causing
harms not only to the government but also to regulated parties. For
instance, invalidating an entire agency or organic act based on
concerns about the excessive independence of agency officials could
be detrimental by halting pending, meritorious investigations and
beneficial regulatory policymaking. Invalidation could also cause
chaos for regulated entities which are not parties to the litigation by
leaving the validity of previously promulgated regulations,
interpretive rules, and agency precedent up in the air.185 Given these
concerns, it is not surprising that the Court has endeavored to salvage
the agency’s functions and granted Congress time to correct
constitutional problems.186 Indeed, some have argued that, as a matter
of separation-of-powers, the Court should seek to uphold
congressional work product to the extent possible.187 Yet limiting
administrative powers and confusion ensures that Congress (and
usually the President) feels little pain when enacting legislation that
182. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Richard A. Posner, Excessive
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 638
(1982).
183. See supra Part II.B.1.
184. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 627–
28 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in Crowley Marine Servs. v. FEDNAV LTD., 915
F. Supp. 218, 222–23 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
185. Cf., e.g., Kaplinsky, supra note 30 (“Would any or all of the CFPB’s actions since
Mr. Cordray was appointed be invalid? How do you unscramble the egg? What about
future CFPB actions?”).
186. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137–43 (1976) (per curiam); see also Thomas E.
Carlson, The Case for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 571 n.121
(noting that the Supreme Court refused to give its holding in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), retroactive effect).
Similar practical considerations routinely influence judicial remedies. See DOBBS, supra
note 117, at 4–5.
187. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 777–78 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(advocating for invalidation of the “all but forgotten” removal provision instead of the
“important federal enactments”); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (2d ed. 1986); Gorod,
supra note 16, at 906, 918–19.
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violates the Constitution’s structural safeguards.188 In other words,
because the courts’ remedies exact a low “price” per violation, the
remedies lose deterrent effect.189
By considering a remedy’s deterrent effect on Congress and the
President, a key difference between structural challenges and most
other administrative litigation becomes apparent. In run-of-the-mill
challenges to agency action, the action at issue, whether investigatory,
adjudicatory, or rulemaking, is the action of the agency itself. But
with structural challenges, the action at issue—the propriety of the
administrative establishment—concerns the action of Congress and
the President, who together enacted legislation that created the
agency. Congress and the President, however, are not before the
courts in the structural-challenge litigation, at least not in any
practical sense.190 Although the United States may be a named party
in such an action,191 the litigation will almost certainly be handled by
agency or other executive-branch lawyers.192 The President and
188. Indeed, the executive branch, despite its role in enacting a structural defect in
most instances, may benefit in three ways when the courts craft an ineffective, pragmatic
remedy. First, the courts’ pragmatic concerns for administrative functioning can enable the
executive branch to avoid administrative uncertainty and disruption that a structural
defect might otherwise bring. Second, a structural defect often inures to the executive
branch’s benefit because the President has a role in all but one method of appointing
officers under the Appointments Clause (and a concomitant removal power) and because
the President, at least in theory, gains power when an agency officer loses protection from
removal. Third, the executive branch may obtain political capital in Congress’s and the
public’s eyes by originally agreeing to legislation that “diminish[es] [future presidents’]
powers,” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 131 S. Ct. 3138, 3155
(2010), despite its later unconstitutionality.
189. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 889.
190. Remedies for unconstitutional legislation outside of the structural context may
pose similar deterrence problems, but typical remedies for such violations (such as
injunctions and invalidated orders) may prove to be more successful remedies overall.
Although Congress and the President may enact unconstitutional, non-structural
legislation, they almost certainly will not be parties to any future litigation. Instead, the
agency officials will be the proper parties. Thus, deterrence may prove problematic. But
the structural challenge is more perplexing because of the litigation-incentive issues
discussed in Part II.B.2. A litigant who prevails in finding a substantive law
unconstitutional obtains the invalidation or limitation of substantive or procedural agency
action.
191. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2012).
192. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 937–47 (2012).
Professor Frost notes how rarely Congress has its own counsel in litigation, except in
certain instances in which the executive and legislative branches have significant,
conflicting interests. Id. Those instances included cases concerning the so-called legislative
veto in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), “the line-item veto, the independent counsel
statute, and qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act.” Id. at 945. Indeed, Congress has
not appeared when the executive branch advocates a position that, at least in theory,
reduces the President’s power and enhances Congress’s. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
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Congress are almost never parties and are also very unlikely to be
involved even behind the scenes.193 Deterring violators who are
absent from court presents a difficult judicial exercise.
Even assuming that deterrence could be achieved, it may be a
misplaced value in most structural challenges. Although the Supreme
Court’s structural jurisprudence has become more analytically formal,
it is often far from consistent or clear. It often fails to provide
Congress notice of exactly which structures are verboten and thus
limits intentional or even negligent structural violations. For instance,
in the Appointments Clause context, Congress has, with one notable
exception,194 generally failed to perceive correctly whether an officer
was an inferior or principal officer or whether a particular officer was
a “head of department.”195 Congress’s failure is understandable
because the Supreme Court has provided two principles for
determining a government official’s status—one based on an official’s
importance and the other based on her subordination to other
officials—that may lead to two different results,196 and it has also
altered descriptions of which administrative entities constitute
“departments.”197 The Court itself has recently conceded that its

Accounting Oversight Bd., No. 08-861, Docket, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-861.htm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013). Because the executive branch typically seeks to uphold the
constitutionality of federal legislation, the executive branch’s arguments may often
advocate an expansive view of Congress’s powers (perhaps at the President’s expense),
whether in structuring the administrative state or otherwise. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S.
Ct. at 3166–70. Usually, litigation decisions are left to the Department of Justice, not any
particular agency. See Kirti Datla & Richard Ravesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 96 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 800–01 (2013).
193. Cf. Kagan, supra note 129, at 2273 (“[N]o President can hope (even with the
assistance of close aides) to monitor the agencies so closely as to substitute all his
preferences for those of the bureaucracy.”).
194. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam). In Buckley, the
legislation called for the blatantly unconstitutional appointment of six FEC
commissioners. Despite the Appointment Clause’s clear requirement that the President
nominate and the Senate confirm principal officers, the legislation called for the entire
Congress to confirm two commissioners nominated by the President, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House. See id. at 113; see also infra note 291
(describing how the constitutional issue concerning FEC’s appointments was raised and
ignored).
195. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 186–88 (1995).
196. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
197. The Court’s definition of “department” continues to expand its unclear contours
and affects who is permitted to appoint inferior officers. See Barnett, Appointment with
Trouble, supra note 38, at 1468–81.
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Article III jurisprudence has “not been entirely consistent.”198 And
the undulation of the Court’s formalistic and functional approaches to
the President’s removal power under Article II may excuse Congress
from providing any particular decision much weight.199 Yet, to its
credit, Congress has, at times, sought to comply with the Court’s
structural limiting principles once the Court has announced them.200
Considering the Court’s unclear jurisprudence and Congress’s general
lack of apparent willfulness, little basis may exist for deterring
Congress from failing to adhere to jurisprudence that has been
labeled “incoherent,”201 “inconsistent,”202 and “ad hoc.”203
III. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES
These remedial values can help to reveal the success or failure of
specific structural-defect remedies. Below, I examine several
structural remedies from the six most significant and recent judicial
decisions in which the courts have held that a violation of the
Appointments Clause, the President’s removal powers, or Article III
occurred.204 To ease the reader’s comparison of similar remedies, I
198. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011); see also id. at 2621 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that the “multifactors relied upon today seem to have entered our
jurisprudence almost randomly”).
199. See Barnett, Independent Agency, supra 38, at 1356–58, 1367–69.
200. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3183
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that during the nine-year period that the Court’s
jurisprudence suggested that Congress could not limit the President’s power to remove
executive officers, Congress did not protect officers from at-will removal).
201. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1517 (1991).
202. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without Principle: A Comment on the Burger
Court’s Jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1038, 1097 (1987).
203. See David M. Drisen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 113 (2009). Although the value of punishment is similar to
deterrence, it is not identical. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal
Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 363 (2003). Punishment seems even more inappropriate,
given Congress’s lack of intentional or willful structural violations. See DOBBS, supra note
117, at 204.
204. As noted, other less common separation-of-powers challenges are occasionally
successful. See supra note 2. This Article limits itself to the more common Article III,
appointments, and officer-removal challenges. Likewise, I have ignored challenges by
federal officials for back pay because that remedy generally satisfies remedial values. See
supra note 56. I also do not address Bowsher v. Synar in depth in this Section, see infra
note 216, because the statute at issue contained specific fallback provisions in anticipation
of structural challenges and thus presents a different scenario than other cases. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 718 (1986) (“Anticipating constitutional challenge to
these procedures, the Act also contains a ‘fallback’ deficit reduction process to take effect
‘[i]n the event that any of the reporting procedures described in section 251 are
invalidated.’ ”).
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have divided those decisions between (1) those whose remedies did
not require a legislative or executive response to a structural violation
because the Court cured the structural defect and (2) those whose
remedies required congressional or executive action because the
Court did not cure any, or all, of the structural defect. As illuminated
below, this remedial feature often, but not always, distinguishes more
successful structural remedies from less successful ones and suggests,
as discussed later, a relatively straightforward way of improving
structural remedies.205
A. Severing the Structural Violation
In three recent decisions, the courts’ remedies did not require the
legislature or the executive to respond and cure a structural defect.
Instead, the courts either severed statutory provisions to cure
structural defects for administrative agencies or otherwise limited the
statutory reach of the bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction in an as-applied
structural challenge to only those claims that could be heard in
compliance with Article III. The remedy in two of these decisions—
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB and Intercollegiate Broadcasting
Systems v. Copyright Royalty Board206—largely, if not completely,
failed to fulfill the remedial values discussed above (i.e.,
compensation, incentive to litigate, and deterrence) because Congress
was not required to confront its constitutional violation and because
the prevailing party was left in no better (or indeed perhaps a worse)
position than it was before the challenge. But a similar remedy in
Stern v. Marshall207 revealed that a minimalist remedy can be more, if
not entirely, effective in satisfying key remedial values, at least in
some jurisdiction-based challenges.
1. Free Enterprise Fund
As previously noted, Free Enterprise Fund concerned the
PCAOB’s investigation of the plaintiff accounting firm.208 The
plaintiff, supported in the litigation by a nonprofit organization,
argued that the board’s significant independence from the SEC,
which in turn was largely independent of the President, improperly

205. See infra Part IV.A.2.
206. 684 F.3d 1332, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28,
2013) (No. 12-928).
207. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
208. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3149
(2010).
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impeded the President’s supervisory powers under Article II.209 The
Court agreed, holding that two tiers of “tenure protection” between
the board and the President (one implied tier for the SEC and one
express tier for the board) were too much.210 Instead of enjoining the
board from taking any actions under SOX, as the plaintiffs had
requested, the Court merely stripped the PCAOB members of their
protection from removal from office by the SEC, thus rendering the
board’s members removable at will by the SEC.211 The Court then
remanded the matter to the board, which retained all of its
substantive powers.212
The Court’s remedy failed to satisfy the first remedial value in
that it provided no compensation for past harm and incomplete
prospective enforcement of the safeguard. To be sure, the Court
prevented some future harm by invalidating the limitations on
removal. But, as with challenges to an agency’s substantive powers,
the regulated party was not compensated for the litigation and
investigation costs (excluding the litigation costs from judicial
proceedings) that occurred under the improperly structured board.
The regulated party did not even obtain a new proceeding from the
Court because the Court merely remanded the matter for continued
review before a now-properly structured board comprised of the
same personnel.213 The new proceedings thus picked up where the
“tainted” proceedings left off, meaning that the remedy did not even
ensure that the structural harms would be prevented going forward
for the investigation of the accounting firm. Nor did the remedy
correct harms that might continue to flow from the board’s prior
actions (whether those actions concerned related investigations,
rulemaking, guidance documents, or other conduct), including those
actions that came to bear directly on the plaintiff.214

209. Id.
210. See id. at 3151–61.
211. See id. at 3161.
212. Id. at 3161, 3164.
213. See id. at 3164; see also id. at 3161 (noting that SOX “remains fully operative as a
law with these tenure restrictions excised” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. That said, the accounting firm was ultimately able to settle its litigation with the
PCAOB with an agreement by which the agency would withdraw inspection reports but
continue to have the option of investigating any past or future conduct. See Michael Cohn,
Beckstead and Watts Settles Inspection Case with PCAOB, ACCT. TODAY (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/Beckstead-Watts-Settles-Inspection-Case-PCAOB
-57388-1.html. The settlement arose as the accounting firm sought in federal district court
to nullify the inspection report that was prepared under the auspices of the PCAOB as
originally established. See id.
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Even if the Court’s remedy provides prospective enforcement, it
may not fulfill the second remedial value of providing incentive to
assert future structural challenges. In Free Enterprise Fund, for
example, even if the nonprofit organization that joined the regulated
party’s litigation paid all of the regulated party’s legal costs, the
regulated party was ultimately placed in an arguably worse position
than it was before the challenge. The investigation continued with a
potentially more hostile board, whose members can now be removed
at will by the SEC. The regulated party’s victory did nothing to alter
the substantive landscape upon which the board can regulate, and it
did not appear to open up a meaningful lobbying avenue for the
regulated party to the SEC, which presumably has faith in the board’s
members it appoints. At most, the unsettled nature of the proper
remedies may have allowed the accounting firm to have a more
favorable settlement position with the agency in this particular case.215
The remedy also does not meaningfully deter Congress in the
future. The Court could have chosen, as it did in Bowsher v. Synar, to
invalidate the board’s substantive powers216 as the plaintiffs
requested.217 A remedy that limited substantive powers would likely
have provided more litigation incentive to regulated parties because
the board would lose meaningful powers over investigations and
215. See id. (noting that the accounting firm had sought additional remedies in the
district court and also that the agency spokeswoman’s explanation of the special
circumstances of this dispute).
216. See Free Enter. Fund at 3162. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the Court
responded to a structural defect by invalidating the Comptroller General’s executive
powers, but leaving the Comptroller’s tenure protection in place. See id. at 733–35. Such a
remedy is certainly more advantageous from the regulated party’s point of view. The
affected party in Bowsher was a union for treasury employees who would be affected by
the Comptroller General’s budget cuts. See id. at 719. The Act, as written, required the
President to accept the budget cuts that the Comptroller sought after reviewing reports by
the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office. See id. at
717–18. The Court held that the Comptroller was improperly exercising executive power
because the Congress, not the President, could remove him from office. See id. at 722–34.
The Court relied upon Congress’s statutory “fallback” provisions in its remedy; these
provisions treated the Comptroller’s report merely as a recommendation that required
congressional and presidential approval to become effective. See id. at 734–36. Prior to the
Court’s decision, the union could meaningfully advance its argument before the
Comptroller General alone or perhaps before the Office of Management and Budget and
the Congressional Budget Office, both of which provided recommended cuts to the
Comptroller General. After the Court’s decision, the union could seek to advance its
position through more diverse, and perhaps more accessible, levers of power: the
Comptroller, the House, the Senate, and the President. The Court’s remedy for a
structural defect provided the impacted party with more avenues for altering the
substantive decision and therefore more incentive to litigate.
217. See Brief for Petitioners at 62, Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-891), 2009
WL 2247130.
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enforcement directed at those very parties. Such a significant
disruption of SOX’s enforcement would also have been likely to
cause Congress to take note of its constitutional misstep. Even if the
Court had merely required Congress itself to decide how to
restructure the agency to comport with the Court’s decision, it would
have caused Congress to bear the costs of legislating anew. When the
Court solved the problem by disturbing the regulatory scheme as little
as possible, it diluted incentives for future Congresses to consider
structural concerns when drafting legislation. Thus, the Court’s
decision in Free Enterprise Fund generally failed to satisfy the three
key remedial values.
To be sure, severing an unconstitutional portion of a statute may
comport with understandable efforts to implement “fallback”
congressional intent and limit disruption to federal programs.218 But
severance in the structural context also undermines the three
remedial values. Most importantly, in a case like Free Enterprise
Fund, such a remedy (without more) provides the prevailing litigant
no substantive benefit. Severance, in short, may create a superficial
appearance that the Court carefully responded to the precise
constitutional violation it identified. Yet a remedy that offers no
advantages at all to the remedy-seeking plaintiff is not likely to foster
remediation of similar structural wrongs in the future.
2. Intercollegiate Broadcasting System
A recent ruling from the D.C. Circuit further demonstrates the
problems that arise when courts apply the ineffective remedy from
Free Enterprise Fund to other structural challenges. In Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, the D.C.
Circuit held that Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”) were not
properly appointed by the Librarian of Congress because they were
principal, as opposed to inferior, officers.219 Principal officers, unlike
inferior officers, must be nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.220 According to the court, CRJs were principal officers
because of their substantive ratemaking powers and their protection
from removal from office by the Librarian of Congress.221 The remedy
the plaintiff sought in the case is not clear, but the plaintiff appears to
218. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006)).
219. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332, 1336
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) (No. 12-928).
220. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2.
221. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1336.
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have wanted the court to invalidate the underlying ratemaking
decision based on the structural defect or, if it’s structural challenge
was not successful, to remand the matter to the Copyright Royalty
Board with certain instructions on how to assess proper rates.222 The
D.C. Circuit, however, decided to remedy the violation “with as little
disruption as possible”223 by providing the same remedy as the
Supreme Court provided in Free Enterprise Fund.224 The D.C. Circuit
invalidated the limitations on the Librarian of Congress’s power to
remove the CRJs,225 thereby rendering them inferior officers, and
remanded the matter for a new determination by those same
judges.226 As described below, this remedy was ineffective, failing to
achieve two of the three remedial purposes that underpin the law of
remedies—litigation incentive and deterrence.
Regarding the first remedial value, the remedy in Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System compensated Intercollegiate in a roundabout
way. These judges were improperly appointed as principal officers by
a department head. The D.C. Circuit later demoted them to inferior
officers, but they were never appointed as inferior officers. Yet,
despite this failing, the protection from removal that the judges had
when the Librarian of Congress appointed them may have benefited
Intercollegiate. The judges’ independence would likely have led the
Librarian to be even more careful with the appointments because of
the Librarian’s more limited ability to control the judges. The
Librarian was clearly identifiable as the appointing party and
responsible for the choice. In short, although the original
appointment was unconstitutional, the appointment exceeded the
underlying principles that the Appointments Clause intends to
further—creating political accountability in an identifiable individual
for inferior-officer appointments.227 Moreover, the court remanded
for a new determination, not merely continued proceedings, and
thereby provided Intercollegiate with the structural rights that it was
entitled to receive in the first instance.228
But, as in Free Enterprise Fund, the remedy fails to provide
incentive to seek redress for future litigants. By invalidating the

222. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 18, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d
1332 (No. 11-1083), 2011 WL 3918320.
223. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1336.
224. See id. at 1334.
225. See id. at 1342.
226. See id.
227. See supra text accompanying note 49.
228. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1342.
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statutory protections from at-will removal and remanding the matter
to the very CRJs who can now be removed at will, the D.C. Circuit
sent the prevailing litigant to potentially hostile judges. The extent to
which the judges are actually hostile may be unknowable, even to
them. But if the court’s remedy applies in similar contexts, the specter
of hostility that looms over follow-up proceedings would likely give
most regulated parties pause before asserting structural challenges.229
After all, Intercollegiate received no other relief: no damages, no
attorneys’ fees, and, despite its request, no substantive instructions for
the judges on remand.230 Nothing prevents the Copyright Royalty
Board from imposing the same rates as it imposed in the original
proceeding, and it could even do so without altering any of its
reasoning or conclusions. Moreover, Intercollegiate will then face the
prospect of taking yet another appeal—with its costs and attorneys’
fees—to have the D.C. Circuit address the substance of its claims.
Although the President and the Librarian of Congress gained power
(whether real or theoretical) from the decision, Intercollegiate has
gained little, if anything, from the challenge.
The D.C. Circuit’s remedy also fails to deter Congress from
creating other unconstitutional appointments in the first instance.
Here, Congress permitted a department head to appoint principal
officers. But Congress encounters no meaningful repercussions
because of its constitutional violation. Congress has no need to take
any action to avoid costs to the administrative state or to pay
damages. Instead, the D.C. Circuit altered the statutory scheme to
create, in its words, “as little disruption as possible.”231 Should other
courts take similar action, future Congresses would have little
incentive to ensure structural safeguards, including those under the
Appointments Clause, when the courts will correct a problem of
Congress’s making.
The D.C. Circuit also did little to reinforce respect for the
Appointments Clause while unnecessarily denigrating another
constitutional safeguard. Instead of requiring Congress to confront
the appointments issue with new legislation, the D.C. Circuit’s focus
on limited disruption of the statutory scheme led it to concentrate on
a different structural safeguard—the executive branch’s ability to
supervise subordinate officers. While severing the protections from
229. Cf. Friedland, supra note 169, at 614 (discussing the hesitancy of parties to
question adjudicators’ impartiality, despite grounds to do so); Sparling, supra note 169, at
479–80.
230. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1341–42.
231. See id. at 1337.
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removal rendered the CRJs inferior for purposes of the
Appointments Clause, it simultaneously invalidated these otherwise
constitutional protections from removal.
Although the Supreme Court struck down one of the two layers
of tenure protections in Free Enterprise Fund,232 it did not do so based
on an Appointments Clause violation.233 Instead, its remedy related to
Congress’s provision of too much independence to PCAOB by
cocooning PCAOB within two layers of protection from removal, so
that the removal-related remedy directly targeted the structural
defect.234 But in the case of the CRJs, they had only one tier of tenure
protection (because the President can remove the Librarian of
Congress at will)235 and thus a constitutional form of independence.236
Free Enterprise Fund, therefore, did not require its remedy here, and
by relying on that decision, the D.C. Circuit hobbled the CRJs’
independence despite the constitutionality of that independence.
By applying an ill-fitting remedy, the D.C. Circuit also created
new problems. CRJs are now subject to political pressure when
deciding matters because of their ability to be removed at will by the
Librarian of Congress, whom the President, in turn, can remove at
will. Despite decades of criticism concerning the unfairness of
copyright-royalty proceedings,237 the D.C. Circuit’s remedy brings the
fairness of those proceedings into question because political actors

232. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161
(2010).
233. See id. at 3162. The Supreme Court relied on its invalidation of the tiered tenure
protection when holding that the PCAOB members were inferior officers. See id. But the
Court never determined whether the PCAOB members were principal officers during the
time that they had tiered protections from removal. See id. Whether the invalidation
remedy was designed as a way of limiting the disruptive effects that would arise had the
Court found an Appointments Clause violation may have to await a perusal of the
Justices’ papers in the future.
234. See id. at 3161.
235. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc., 684 F.3d at 1341.
236. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692–93
(1988); accord Perkins v. United States, 116 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1886) (“[W]hen Congress,
by law, vests the appointment of interior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit
and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest. The
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to
limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to
the officers so appointed. The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of
appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by such
legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident
thereto.”).
237. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 449–50 (8th ed. 2010).
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can assert more control over the hearings’ outcomes.238 To be sure,
the increased political nature of the proceedings may not raise due
process concerns because the CRJs preside over ratemaking,239 not
adjudicatory, hearings.240 But the D.C. Circuit should have at least
considered its chosen remedy’s effect on the fairness of those
proceedings that Congress has long sought to improve.241
3. Stern
Unlike in Free Enterprise Fund and Intercollegiate Broadcasting
System, a minimalist remedy in Stern v. Marshall (although one that
did not require the severance of any statutory language) was more
effective in satisfying key remedial values.242 The Stern Court, as the
prevailing party requested, invalidated a bankruptcy court’s order
that resolved a state-law claim in the debtor’s favor.243 The Court did
so because the bankruptcy court’s statutory jurisdiction over the
state-law claim as part of the court’s “core” bankruptcy jurisdiction
violated Article III.244 By invalidating the bankruptcy court’s order,
238. Drew Singer, Ruling could compromise U.S. administrative judges’ autonomy,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 16, 2012, 5:38 PM),
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSBRE87F1AZ20120816.
239. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012); Andrew D. Stephenson, Webcaster II: A Case Study
of Business Rate Setting by Formal Rulemaking, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 393, 405 (2011).
240. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–46 (1915)
(distinguishing Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)).
241. Moreover, if courts applied the same remedy to other similarly situated officials,
such as administrative law judges (“ALJs”), the remedy could create due process
concerns. Unlike the CRJs’ ratemaking proceedings, ALJs preside over adjudicatory
proceedings for which the Due Process Clause requires sufficiently impartial adjudicators.
See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908). To provide ALJs independence to
further their impartiality, Congress has granted them protection from at-will removal. See
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012). ALJs’ status as employees or officers is unresolved. See, e.g.,
Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 809–14 (2013)
(discussing questions concerning the propriety of ALJ appointments). If they are officers,
many are not appointed properly because they are appointed by heads of agencies, not
heads of departments. See § 3105. A remedy that would seek to “demote” them from
officers to employees by permitting at-will removal—as in Intercollegiate Broadcasting
System—would raise significant questions as to the ALJs’ impartiality and thus create (or
inflame already existing) due process concerns. See Barnett, supra, at 816–28.
242. Although bankruptcy courts are not agencies, courts and scholars have long
considered decisions concerning both agencies and Article I courts when deciding Article
III issues. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 852 (1986); JOHN M. ROGERS, MICHAEL HEALY & RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 312–46 (3d ed. 2012). I consider the bankruptcy decisions here
because, despite the differences between structural challenges to Article I courts and
agencies, the structural remedies in those cases can inform structural remedies in the
administrative context.
243. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
244. See id. at 2608.
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the Court gave a later-in-time state-court judgment that favored the
prevailing private party (i.e., the creditor) preclusive effect over the
earlier bankruptcy-court judgment.245
Because the prevailing party obtained exactly what he had
requested, the Court’s remedy appears to have been sufficient for him
to challenge the bankruptcy court’s structure. Familiar and routine
challenges to state and federal court jurisdiction suggest that
remedies that provide either preclusive effect to a particular
judgment or proceedings in a new forum create sufficient litigation
incentive. This is so because the parties would then be left to litigate
the issue in what the prevailing party perceives as a more favorable
forum, whether because of a prevailing judgment or the beneficial
reputation of the judge or juries. Indeed, the general availability of a
new forum is what creates more incentive than may exist with other
structural challenges, such as in Intercollegiate Broadcasting System,
where the prevailing party must return to the authority of the
challenged officials.246 Aside from generally non-compensable
litigation costs, the prevailing party that receives a new forum would
also obtain all to which it was originally entitled and thus be generally
compensated for the structural violation.
The remedy also provided as much deterrence to Congress as
exists for other substantive constitutional violations, even if that
deterrence is rather insignificant. In Stern, the Court held that the
particular kind of state-law claim was not properly before the
bankruptcy court despite its statutory jurisdiction.247 The Court in
essence established, as in other as-applied constitutional challenges,
the constitutional limitations of the statutory grant of jurisdiction
over “core” bankruptcy proceedings without severing any statutory
language. Congress, as with most other applied challenges, likely feels
little sting from the Court’s limits on the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction. Thus, the remedy does little to deter Congress from
violating Article III. Yet, this failure applies to many as-applied
challenges, not only structural litigation. Moreover, given the Court’s
admission in Stern that its Article III jurisprudence “has not been
entirely consistent,”248 it may be largely impossible to deter Congress
from stepping over boundaries that it cannot ascertain. Thus, a
remedy that involves merely severance may be slightly more
245. See id. at 2600–01.
246. See Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332,
1341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2735 (U.S. May 28, 2013) (No. 12-928).
247. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
248. Id. at 2611.
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successful, although not entirely so, in satisfying remedial values as
part of a jurisdiction-based challenge concerning only private-party
litigants than in the purely regulatory context.
B.

Requiring Legislative or Executive Action

Structural remedies better satisfy remedial values for prevailing
parties when courts require the political branches to respond to the
structural violation with curative action. Such was the case in Ryder v.
United States.249 But courts have often dulled the remedy’s
effectiveness—for example in Buckley v. Valeo and, to a limited
extent, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.250—by validating past administrative actions and providing
Congress lengthy stays of the judgment to fashion remedial
legislation. By doing so, the courts have undermined the remedial
values that are important to prevailing regulated parties.
1. Ryder
In Ryder, the Supreme Court determined that civilian judges of
the Coast Guard Court of Military Review were not properly
appointed and thus were unauthorized to hear Ryder’s appeal for
several drug-related convictions.251 The judges were inferior officers
who were improperly appointed by the Department of
Transportation’s General Counsel, not the Secretary of
Transportation—a department head—as the Appointments Clause
and governing statute required.252 Turning to the remedial questions,
the Court unanimously held that Ryder was “entitled to a hearing
before a properly appointed panel of that court.”253 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court rejected the “de facto officer doctrine,” which
validates the actions of those acting under the color of official title
despite an invalid appointment.254 The Court noted that the doctrine
was limited to mere statutory, as opposed to constitutional, challenges
brought only on collateral review.255 The Court also recognized that it
had created a similar de facto doctrine—distinct from the de facto

249. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
250. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
251. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 179.
252. See id. at 179–80. The government conceded that the appointments violated the
Appointments Clause. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655 (1997) (referring to
Brief for the United States at 9 n.9, Ryder, 515 U.S. 177 (No. 94-431). 1995 WL 130573).
253. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188.
254. See id. at 180.
255. See id. at 180–83.
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officer doctrine—for constitutional, appointments-based challenges.256
But the Court stated that it was “not inclined to extend” this other
vague de facto doctrine beyond challenges to entire administrative or
legislative bodies that implicated federal voting rights or elections.257
For the most part, the Ryder Court’s remedy merits praise. The
Court partially compensated Ryder and provided prospective
enforcement of the safeguard by granting him a new hearing “before
a properly appointed panel of that court.”258 This remedy, similar to
specific performance in contract law, gave Ryder what he was entitled
to receive in the first instance. In particular, the properly constituted
panel might be different from the initial, improperly appointed panel;
in this case, the rehearing would not be an empty gesture.259 And even
if the same individuals were later appointed, their installation as
adjudicators would have then undergone the political scrutiny that
the Constitution requires. With the department head’s new
appointments, the appointment power would be properly cabined in
limited executive officers, thereby requiring identifiable executive
officers to take the praise and blame for the appointment.260 To be
sure, the remedy did not fully compensate the prevailing litigant
because he did not receive any compensation for the past harm,
whether dignitary or financial, in having to participate in
unconstitutional proceedings. But this remedial failing is common in
public-law litigation.261
A new hearing before properly appointed officers likely provides
as much litigation incentive as exists for other administrative-action
challenges, even if the incentive is still relatively low. For instance, in
the case of the Coast Guard judges, Congress had permitted the head
of department—the Secretary of Transportation—to make the
appointment, but he had failed to do so.262 The Secretary’s
appointment of these officers after the Court’s decision took only a

256. See id. at 183–84.
257. See id. The two decisions at issue included Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per
curiam), which concerned the unconstitutional appointment of the FEC, and Connor v.
Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972), in which the Court refused to invalidate the actions of
legislators who were elected under an unconstitutional apportionment plan. See Ryder,
515 U.S. at 183–84.
258. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188.
259. The likelihood of new individuals being appointed is probably very low. For
instance, the Secretary of Transportation appointed the same civilian judges whose
appointments were held invalid. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 654 (1997).
260. See supra text accompanying note 49.
261. See supra Part II.B.1.
262. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 656–58.
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minimal amount of administrative effort.263 Congress had authorized
the appointment in a constitutional manner. The remedy—a hearing
before properly appointed judges264—cures the concerns that arose
from the improper enforcement of Congress’s legislation at little cost
and tracks the remedy afforded for more common procedural
violations.265 The challenger thus has as much incentive to challenge
the structural defect as he or she would for challenging any other
procedural administrative violation. Moreover, unlike with certain
violations and remedies, the adjudicator, if later appointed (as is
usual), arises from the challenge in a stronger position because the
adjudicator is now unquestionably a properly appointed federal
officer. This improved status should reduce a regulated party’s real or
speculative fears of animus.266 This minimal level of incentive is not
optimal, but at least it corresponds to incentive for procedural
challenges and, if the appointment is cured of its defect, provides
more incentive than exists for other structural challenges by
ultimately elevating the status of the challenged officers.
The remedy also has no need to deter Congress because
Congress did not create an improper appointment. At the same time,
the executive branch had to absorb the inefficiencies that redundant
proceedings and a later proper appointment brought about, much as
it must do after other successful administrative challenges. The
remedy here of re-appointment may appear relatively minor, but it
might be said so, too, is the transgression. Here, the wrong official
within the department appointed the judges. The remedy’s symmetry
with harm requires the executive to assume some costs for the
violation, even if those costs are not onerous. Ultimately, the remedy
was mostly successful in satisfying the three key remedial values.
263. See, e.g., id. at 654.
264. Of course, the prevailing party is not necessarily entitled to a different result. For
example, the properly appointed military appellate tribunal once more rejected the same
arguments that Ryder had presented in his original appellate hearing and once more
affirmed his sentence. See United States v. Ryder, No. 947, at 2–3 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App.
Apr. 23, 1997) (per curiam).
265. See, e.g., Chaffin, supra note 131, at 464–65 (“Most courts sustaining [procedural
challenges based on section 553 of the APA] immediately invalidate the rule and remand
the case to the agency with instructions to follow proper section 553 procedures.”).
266. Yet, notice that when Congress has not provided the department head with
statutory authority to appoint, the new hearing must await new legislation that grants the
department head appointing authority. A department head may approbate the
appointment of a subordinate only when a statute allows approbation. See United States v.
Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 308 (1888). In these cases, the incentive for challenging the action
would increase because Congress may not enact curing legislation within the applicable
limitations period or swiftly enough for the agency to maintain its interest in the regulated
party or a particular regulatory action.
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2. Buckley
In contrast to the generally successful remedy in Ryder, the
Court’s structural remedy in Buckley v. Valeo demonstrates that
merely requiring one or more political branches to take curative
action does not by itself guarantee the satisfaction of key remedial
values. In Buckley, political parties and candidates challenged
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended
in 1974.267 The plaintiffs successfully argued that, among other things,
none of the commissioners of the FEC were properly installed under
the Appointments Clause.268 As a remedy, the Court invalidated the
FEC’s executive powers (rulemaking, enforcement, and so forth)269
but allowed the FEC to continue its quasi-legislative functions (data
collection).270 The Court also stayed its judgment for thirty days to
permit Congress to reconstitute the FEC.271 Moreover, without any
briefing from the parties on the proper remedy,272 the Court granted
the FEC’s past acts “de facto validity”273 and permitted the FEC to
continue its executive functions during the period of the stay.274 The
Buckley Court’s remedy succeeded in satisfying the three remedial
desiderata only in part, and it also raised troubling implications.
As to the first key remedial value, the Court’s remedy provided
no compensation whatsoever to the prevailing parties, except in the
form of limited prospective relief. Even in the face of a blatant
constitutional structural defect, the Court provided all of the FEC’s
past actions de facto validity, and because those past actions were
deemed valid, the prevailing parties received no compensation for
any harm the defect brought about.275 The Court later in Ryder stated
267. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (per curiam).
268. See id. at 9–11, 113.
269. See id. at 138–41.
270. See id. at 137–38.
271. See id. at 143.
272. See Conference Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist re: Buckley v. Valeo (Jan.
20, 1976) (“I do not think that it would be wise for the Court to make a make a holding [as
to the proper remedy] without the benefit of any argument or briefing.”). It appears that
the Court’s remedy originated from Justice Brennan’s chambers and that four Justices
agreed during a luncheon. See Conference Memorandum from Justice Brennan re:
Buckley v. Valeo (Jan. 20, 1976); Conference Memorandum from Justice Marshall re:
Buckley v. Valeo (Jan. 20, 1976). All conference memos are available in Justice Powell’s
papers, held at the library at Washington and Lee University School of Law. See Powell
Papers, WASH. & LEE UNIV., http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=236 (last
visited Dec. 28, 2013).
273. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142.
274. See id. at 143.
275. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83, 188 (1995); Stacy M. Lindstedt,
Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally
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that the prevailing parties received the declaratory and injunctive
relief that they had pursued.276 But the Buckley plaintiffs did not
obtain all that they sought. They also requested complete invalidation
of the FEC and its past actions.277 True, the regulated parties, without
further action by Congress, would not have to worry about future
FEC regulatory actions. But the Court’s awarded relief afforded no
compensation for past harms or full enforcement of the safeguard
going forward because past agency actions remained in place. The
Appointments Clause, the bastion of separation of powers,
apparently has low walls and shallow moats.
The remedy provided, as to the second key remedial value, only
limited incentive for future structural challenges. The constriction of
the agency’s prospective powers provided some incentive because if
Congress failed to act within thirty days, the prevailing parties would
have hobbled the FEC by having its significant enforcement and
rulemaking powers invalidated.278 Nevertheless, the prevailing party
continued to be subject to the agency’s previous actions because of
their de facto validity, thus dulling the regulated party’s victory.
The Court’s remedy likewise created only a limited deterrent
effect and thereby did not fully satisfy the third key remedial value.
The Court required Congress to reconstitute the FEC in a
constitutional manner.279 If it failed to do so, the FEC would lose all
executive power going forward.280 But the Court’s stay, while
respecting interbranch comity,281 limited the deterrent effect of its
remedy because it gave Congress a chance to mend its ways without
suffering any harm for the structural violation.282 Indeed, unlike the
scenarios in which executive officials have failed to execute
Congress’s properly established appointments,283 the Court
invalidated no agency order or action whatsoever. As long as
Congress acted within thirty days, it was to be as if Congress never
violated the Constitution at all. A structural-redesign grace period

Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1185 (2011) (“[Buckley’s] remedy, then,
did not help anyone who may have been injured by the improper appointment . . . up to
that point.”).
276. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183.
277. See Reply Brief of Appellants, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL
171458, at *111.
278. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142–43.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 136–43.
281. See Nagel, supra note 34, at 718.
282. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142–43.
283. See supra Part III.B.1.
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implicitly tells Congress that it may blatantly violate the
Constitution’s structural safeguards (or at least push structural
boundaries to the maximum) and then later create a proper agency, if
it acts fast enough, without any adverse consequences at all.
Much of the remedial inadequacy in Buckley comes from its
improper validation of the agency’s actions. As the Supreme Court
later suggested in Ryder, the Buckley Court’s reliance on a de facto
validity doctrine—similar to, but apparently distinct from, the de
facto officer doctrine—was misplaced.284 The de facto officer doctrine
validates the actions of “a person acting under color of official title”
despite a statutory defect concerning an officer’s appointment in a
collateral attack on a prior judgment.285 The purpose of the doctrine is
to prevent, based on “technical defects,”286 chaos to the administrative
state and uncertainty for parties that have relied on the individual’s
rulings.287 But the defect in Buckley was constitutional, not technical
or statutory, and concerned the formation of a new independent
agency. The Court provided no evidence of chaos that would arise
without the validation of prior actions. Indeed, the agency was
relatively new and had yet to engage in significant regulatory activity
(outside of issuing numerous advisory opinions288) despite upcoming
federal elections.289 Buckley, in other words, was not a suitable
candidate for application of a de facto validity doctrine based on
either the kind of structural defect at issue or its hypothesized ill
effects.
The Ryder Court, however, twice suggested that a de facto
validity doctrine—as opposed to the de facto officer doctrine—may
apply when the structural challenge extends to an entire body where

284. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184 (1995).
285. See id. at 180; see also Clokey, supra note 51, at 1122 (citing EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp.
241 (N.D. Ill. 1980)) (noting rejected challenges to the expired term of an EEOC
administrator).
286. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180 (quoting 36A AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees
§ 578 (1984)).
287. See ALBERT CONSTANTINEAU, A TREATISE ON THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE 4
(1910); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without
Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 595, 600 (2001).
288. For a collection of the FEC’s advisory opinions in 1975 alone, see Advisory
Opinions, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao;jsessionid
=C6860AFE8044A01A86808798736E97AE;jsessionid=9F6EAB2EE530E6E9AA17C2937
948D86F?SUBMIT=year&YEAR=1975 (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
289. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D.D.C. 1975) (noting that the
amendments became effective in October 1974 and issuing an opinion to the constitutional
challenge in January 1975).
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“grave disruption or inequity” would arise.290 Although applying the
doctrine in such situations may honor settled legal interests that
occurred prior to the litigation, it creates a perverse relationship
between the remedy and the significance of the violation: the more
striking (and often obvious) the structural defect and its effects, the
more insignificant the judicial remedy. To be sure, much harm can
arise from the invalid appointment of those who head an agency. But
for that reason, Congress, contrary to its actions in Buckley, should be
attentive to the required (and relatively clear) strictures for a proper
appointment.291 Even with the appointment of lower-level officers,
the invalid appointment may be obvious, and the harm from
improper appointments can be significant.292 An inverse remedy-toharm paradigm, in other words, actively seeks not to compensate and
enforce, to provide incentive, or to deter based on perceived chaos—
chaos that arises directly from Congress’s inattention to structural
safeguards. The safeguards, contrary to the Court’s panegyrics to
their importance, look like technicalities and merely matters of
etiquette and protocol that do not warrant full prospective
enforcement.
This is not to say that a court’s consideration of administrative
chaos should be irrelevant in determining an equitable remedy.293 For
instance, the disruption to the administrative state may be especially
high in the context of already-final adjudications because the need to
preserve settled legal interests is great. Of particular significance, the
retroactive invalidation of final orders concerning parties who did not
assert a structural challenge would provide no compensation or
incentive to the prevailing party in the structural litigation. Any
additional deterrent effect or judicial respect for the safeguard that

290. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–85.
291. After all, Congress acknowledged and ignored the arguments that the
appointments were blatantly unconstitutional. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-1239, at 137–38
(1974); Various Measures Relating to Federal Election Reform: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and the Committee on Rules and Administration
on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, S. 1303, S. 1355 & S.J. Res. 110, 93d Cong. 352–54
(GAO memorandum); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee
on House Administration on H.R. 7612, S. 372, and Related Election Reform Bills, 93d
Cong. 141, 161, 192, 229 (discussing the functional necessity of cross-branch
appointments).
292. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing constitutional appointments of
Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”)); John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 915 (2009) (noting that the Director of the
Patent and Trademark Office’s appointment of APJs was almost certainly unconstitutional
because the Director was clearly not a head of department).
293. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 287, at 600–01.
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would arise from a stronger remedy is probably unlikely to be worth
the price of upset legal interests. Likewise, a strong remedy
unencumbered by a de facto validity doctrine would likely have no
deterrent effect if the structural defect arose only through the
Supreme Court’s announcement of a new principle or rule (such as a
new, narrow reading of “head of department”). Other scenarios may
exist in which the de facto validity doctrine properly limits remedies.
But remedial values should be part of the remedial calculus, as the
courts seek to balance chaos, third-party interests, and the overall
effectiveness of the remedy with respect to the prevailing party,
potential future parties, and the political branches.
3. Northern Pipeline
The Court’s remedy in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. generally satisfied key remedial values—
better than the remedy in Buckley, but not as well as the one in
Ryder. In Northern Pipeline, the Court ordered the dismissal of a
debtor’s action in the bankruptcy court to recover money from a noncreditor third party.294 In response to the third party’s challenge to the
bankruptcy court’s authority to hear the debtor’s action, the Court
prospectively invalidated the bankruptcy court’s extensive statutory
jurisdiction and stayed its judgment to provide Congress time to
formulate a suitable solution.295
The remedy provided sufficient compensation, prospective
enforcement, and incentives to litigate by giving the prevailing party
what it requested and to what it would be entitled in other
jurisdictional disputes. The prevailing party in Northern Pipeline had
the debtor’s action dismissed in such a manner that the debtor could
re-file the action in a state or federal trial court.296 As a tactical
matter, the non-debtor third party most likely sought to obtain a
more favorable venue before a non-specialized (and, most likely, an
Article III) judge, as compared to what non-debtors often perceive as
debtor-friendly bankruptcy judges.297 By giving the prevailing party

294. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56–57 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
295. See id. at 56–57, 88–89.
296. See id. at 56–57.
297. Bankruptcy courts are, fairly or not, often perceived as debtor-friendly. See H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 90–91 (1977); Debra L. Baker, Bankruptcy—The Last Environmental
Loophole?, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 379, 406 (1993); Martin Bienenstock, Marc Kieselstein &
David Fischer, Recharacterization & Asset Securitization: “When Is a Duck a Duck,” 1
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 575, 583 (2003); Kevin P. McDowell, Note, Statutory Authority
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exactly what it requested (i.e., dismissal of the current action and
potentially a new hearing in another forum), the Court afforded
similarly situated prevailing parties incentive to litigate by giving
them the ability to litigate in a proper forum. This remedy would
typically arise in analogous jurisdictional disputes and give the
prevailing party that to which it was originally entitled had the
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction not violated Article III.
The Court also achieved some level of deterrence with its
remedy.298 The plurality, contrary to the wishes of two concurring
justices, invalidated the statutory provision that granted the
bankruptcy court broad jurisdiction over all “civil proceedings arising
under title 11.”299 Going forward, this remedy left bankruptcy
proceedings up in the air because the bankruptcy courts lost their
statutory jurisdiction over all claims, and the Court gave Congress a
period of time (and an extension upon the Solicitor General’s
request) to create a constitutional bankruptcy system.300 During the
Court’s stay, the judiciary passed emergency bankruptcy rules,301 and
Congress enacted new legislation more than two years later.302
Congress was required to create new law as to the bankruptcy
system’s structure, a process that was time-consuming and
controversial.303 Such a far-reaching remedy serves to deter Congress
from making other mistakes of the same ilk.
But the Court’s accommodation for Congress may have also
encouraged legislative lethargy. Congress in fact took more than two
years to enact curative legislation.304 Despite the likely impossibility
of proving a causal relationship between remedial limitations and
congressional inaction, courts going forward should learn from the
for Bankruptcy Judges to Conduct Jury Trials: Fact of Fiction? In re United Missouri Bank
of Kansas City, N.A., 56 MO. L. REV. 729, 745 (1991).
298. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 89–90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
the judgment).
299. See id. at 54 (plurality opinion) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 Supp. IV)).
300. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 459 U.S. 813 (1982)
(mem.).
301. See John E. Matthews, The Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy Courts:
Constitutional Implications in the Wake of Grandfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 43, 54 (1991).
302. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2603 (2012) (discussing the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984).
303. See, e.g., Lawrence P. King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of
Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 107–20 (1983).
304. See Katelyn Knight, Note, Equitable Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 253, 258 (2009) (noting that Congress took more than two years after
Northern Pipeline to pass the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984).
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example and consider whether mitigating the effect of a structural
defect may affect the political branches’ response. The point is not
that delay and emergency rules are always improper. Instead, the
point is that congressional deterrence and lethargy should be
additional factors in the courts’ remedial analysis.
IV. RESPONDING TO STRUCTURAL REMEDIATION’S CHALLENGES
The foregoing discussion reveals various structural remedies and
their varied success in satisfying the three key remedial values. These
decisions demonstrate that no one structural remedy is likely to be
wholly satisfactory in all contexts, although certain remedies perform
better than others. By considering these decisions and their structural
remedies, courts and scholars are in a better position to identify the
problematic structural remedies and contexts and then formulate
appropriate responses.
So what are the potentially appropriate responses? Courts could
proceed down three paths: (1) improving structural remedies and the
discussion of remedial values, (2) limiting the nature of the safeguard
and the rhetoric that surrounds it, or (3) reconsidering what interest,
if any, regulated parties should have in structural challenges.305
A. Improving Remedies
Below I consider three possible ways to improve structural
remedies. First, I suggest that the parties brief the issue of a proper
remedy to bring the issue into focus. Second, courts could provide
more significant equitable remedies, such as requiring Congress to
cure the structural defect if the agency is to continue acting or
invalidating the past actions of an improperly structured agency.
These and similar remedies, as indicated from the analysis in Part III,
are more likely to lead to the satisfaction of key remedial values.
Finally, Congress should perhaps consider providing statutory
remedies, such as scheduled damages.
1. Briefing Remedial Options
A relatively easy way to improve structural remediation would
be to have the parties brief the issue of remedies. Briefing the issue, if

305. These paths need not be mutually exclusive. For instance, remedies may improve
in certain scenarios but not in others, and judicial candor can help explain why the
remedies must differ. Or, for another example, a party may brief the issues for the court,
but the court may still be candid about not awarding requested relief. I shall, nonetheless,
discuss each path separately for ease of discussion.
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nothing else, ensures that courts confront remedial options and
values. Notably, structural remedies have failed most in these
situations—such as in Free Enterprise Fund, Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, and Buckley—in which the prevailing party
neither received the relief that it requested nor briefed remedies or
remedial values in any detail.306 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist lamented
in internal conference memos the lack of briefing as to the Court’s de
facto validity ruling in Buckley, which largely undermined remedial
values and was later critiqued and limited by a unanimous Court in
Ryder.307 Because courts often ignore the prevailing parties’
perfunctory request for relief and provide remedies that fail to satisfy
key remedial values, the parties have incentive to (and should)
engage the courts in their arguments about the nature of an
appropriate, meaningful structural remedy in light of the three key
remedial values. By creating a conversation, as Ryder suggests, the
remedies are more likely to match the Court’s rhetoric about the
underlying rights and fulfill remedial values.
This briefing may prove most useful after a court has established
the nature of the structural defect.308 Parties may contest whether
several structural defects exist in their briefing on the merits. For
instance, in Free Enterprise Fund, the plaintiffs asserted challenges
based on the Appointments Clause and the President’s supervisory
powers.309 The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs only on their
latter claim.310 The kind of violation could, of course, likely influence
the appropriate remedy. Had the Court remanded the matter to the
D.C. Circuit to address the remedial issue, the parties could have
briefed the issue of remedies separately from the structural safeguard
involved and considered germane remedial values (such as those
discussed here and perhaps others, such as chaos, practicality of
enforcement, and comity for the other branches).

306. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 62, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130; Reply Brief of
Appellants, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171458, at
*111 (providing some discussion on congressional intent and the propriety of severance
and then stating that “the Commission itself should be invalidated”); Brief for Appellants
at 17, Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (Nos. 11-1083, 11-1103), 2011 WL 3918320.
307. See supra note 272; supra text accompanying note 284.
308. My thanks to Professor Bill Araiza for this insight.
309. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147–48.
310. Id. at 3149, 3151.
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2. Liberalized Equitable Remedies
Beyond engaging with the remedial issue, courts could begin to
provide more potent injunctive relief to render the underlying norms
more meaningful. For instance, courts could require Congress to
reconfigure a structurally sound agency, as the Court did in Northern
Pipeline and Buckley. To strengthen the effect of requiring Congress
to cure structural defects, courts could also limit their reliance on
stays and de facto validity doctrines that seek to mitigate the effects
of a more potent remedy. Doing so, as discussed above, provides
increased incentives for those seeking redress because if Congress
fails to reconfigure the structurally defective agency, regulated parties
may not face future regulatory oversight. By placing regulatory
programs into jeopardy and requiring Congress to confront its
mistakes, the Court also provides a remedy that increases deterrence
of wrongdoing. To be sure, the effect of remedies on Congress’s
motivation raises an empirical question which is probably impossible
to answer.311 But requiring Congress to clean up its own mess might
well lead the political branches to take structural safeguards more
seriously. Likewise, providing wholly new proceedings before a
properly fashioned agency as part of the injunctive relief—as in
Ryder—would provide increased enforcement of the norm (through a
specific-performance-like mechanism) and thus help achieve, at least
in part, compensatory values and better achieve future enforcement
for the prevailing party. The courts would be able to provide this
more effective response to structural defects by using their familiar
equitable powers that should generally present fewer concerns over
judicial aggrandizement.
The awarding of more aggressive injunctive relief, however,
comes with concerns. Aside from concerns about judicial
overreaching,312 hobbling an agency may be too severe a sanction
311. In other contexts, Congress has responded to the Court’s constitutional rulings
and attempted to address the Court’s concerns, suggesting that the Court’s decisions do
influence Congress in later legislation. For instance, after the Court invalidated childpornography prohibitions on First Amendment grounds, Congress passed new, more
tailored legislation that adequately responded to the Court’s concerns. See United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 289–91, 307 (2008) (describing how Congress sought to draft
new child-pornography provisions in light of the Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which struck down prior prohibitions on child
pornography). Likewise, after the Court struck down Congress’s attempt to regulate
minors’ ability to view pornography in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), Congress tried
a second time to enact better-tailored prohibitions in the Child Online Protection Act
(“COPA”). See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661 (2004) (affirming the judgment that
kept the preliminary injunction in place that prevented enforcement of COPA).
312. See BICKEL, supra note 187, at 111–98.
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from the perspective of others whose conduct the agencies regulate.
These other parties may well have ordered their businesses around
the agencies’ regulations and guidance.313 By providing an openended period during which the agency lacks power, other regulated
parties would be uncertain whether to alter their businesses to
become viable market participants unbounded by the regulatory state
or to await curative legislation that will maintain the regulatory status
quo.314
The sanction may also be an inappropriate judicial remedy
because, as a matter of realpolitik, it favors those that seek to limit
administrative action. Either house of Congress (or the President)
could stop a controversial agency from functioning by withholding
support for curative legislation. Such a remedy would permit that
single house (or the President) to do what it (or he or she) could not
otherwise do alone—abolish a particular agency.315 This possibility is
not merely theoretical. Consider the recent structural challenge to the
CFPB, established by the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.316 If the remedy
for the alleged structural violations was to invalidate all of the
CFPB’s actions until the passage of curative legislation, the CFPB
may well never rise again because Republicans, who have long been
hostile to its existence and were the minority party when it was
created, now control the House.317
3. Legislative Participation
Because of the drawbacks associated with judicially crafted
equitable relief, one possible response to this problem is for Congress
to step in and provide complementary remedies by statute, largely
freeing courts from having to worry about proper judicial

313. The Supreme Court, however, did not appear too troubled by settled legal
interests in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NRLB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010), when it held that the
NLRB lacked authority to issue more than 600 of its orders because it violated a statutory
quorum requirement. See id. at 2639, 2644–45.
314. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 604 (considering third parties’ interests when
fashioning remedies).
315. See Gorod, supra note 16, at 924.
316. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 240–45,
State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner, No. 1:12-cv-01032 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2012),
2012 WL 4229466 (asserting several structural challenges to the CFPB).
317. See, e.g., Pat Garofalo, House Republicans Propose Cutting Consumer Protection
Bureau and Foreclosure Prevention, THINK PROGRESS, (Apr. 13, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://
thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/04/13/464400/financial-services-budget-repeal
/?mobile=nc; Suzy Khimm, The GOP’s New Push to Defang the CFPB, WASH. POST
WONKBLOG, (Feb. 8, 2012, 4:33 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/post/the-gops-new-push-to-defang-the-cfpb/2012/02/08/gIQA1DrfzQ_blog.html.
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remediation. A statutory remedy could provide new incentives for
litigants to seek redress by, for instance, providing scheduled,
monetary damages. Because a structural harm is hard to quantify,
scheduled damages (like liquidated damages) may serve a useful
role.318 Scheduled damages permit the legislature to assign an amount
that, in the legislature’s view, serves to compensate for past harms
and to deter.319 The scheduled damages would thereby provide more
incentive for regulated parties to seek redress. Along with injunctive
relief to prevent future violations, such a monetary award would thus
provide the regulated party with a remedy that promotes the three
underlying remedial virtues.320 This approach would promote the
“passive virtues” of a limited judiciary by permitting the legislature to
develop more carefully crafted remedies.321
As part of compensating prevailing parties with scheduled
damages, Congress could also provide attorneys’ fees for a prevailing
party under a similar rubric as found under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.322 Doing
so would allow prevailing parties to obtain most of their litigation
costs and place them on more equal footing with other kinds of
constitutional litigation, such as those brought under the Civil Right
Acts under Title 42 of the U.S. Code.323 Providing attorneys’ fees
alone would not, however, likely provide sufficient incentive for
regulated parties to bring structural challenges. Such recovery would
place the party only in the same, not a better, position as it was before
the challenge. A significant monetary award on top of the cost of
bringing an action would be necessary to provide sufficient incentive,
especially in light of possible perceived damage to the relationship
between the regulated party and the official or agency.
That said, even if substantial scheduled awards and attorneys’
fees provide compensation and incentive to litigants, they still may
not prevent Congress from transgressing constitutional limits. Such
318. See Bray, supra note 104, at 755–57 (noting that scheduled damages, a form of
“announc[ed]” remedies, may not be optimal, but they are “well suited to the world of the
second best”).
319. See id. at 761–63 (arguing that scheduled damages can be more beneficial from a
compensatory and distributive justice theory for difficult-to-quantify harms).
320. See supra Part II.B.2.
321. See BICKEL, supra note 187, 111–98.
322. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006).
323. See id. (permitting reasonable attorneys’ fees for “any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX
of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title” (alterations in original)).
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awards, whether paid from an agency’s budget or the U.S. Treasury,
would not likely deter Congress. Neither legislative house nor its
members would be meaningfully affected by damages even in the
high six- or seven-figures range. Scheduled damages, therefore, may
fail to achieve one of their three key purposes. But considering the
unknown or limited deterrent effect of remedies on Congress,324 this
remedial failure in the structural context may be of limited
importance, given such a remedy’s other virtues.
Perhaps more significantly, Congress is unlikely to create a
monetary remedy that is meant to incentivize challenges to
congressional authority. Not only has Congress been leery of
extending damage awards and causes of action that implicate the
federal purse,325 but it would almost certainly be hesitant to help
regulated parties bring suits that are meant to hamstring legislative
discretion. Instead, Congress has addressed remedial concerns only
by establishing some “fallback” provisions that dictate results when
the Court invalidates a statutory provision.326 Thus, statutory
damages, which may provide a generally successful remedy, stand
little chance of enactment.
B.

Judicial Candor Concerning Safeguards’ Limitations

The potential implausibility of scheduled damages and more
meaningful equitable relief may be strong evidence that structural
remedies cannot be rendered more consequential for regulated
parties. Courts could concede that, despite judicial declarations of the
importance of structural design,327 many safeguards are not
meaningful for regulated parties because other considerations—such
as regulatory chaos, sovereign immunity, and judicial minimalist
remedies—are deemed more important than the key remedial values
of compensation, litigation incentive, and deterrence. The
preeminence of other values suggests that the safeguards serve
primarily as aspirational guidelines for the political branches to follow
when constructing administrative entities. If a branch of government
seeks to vindicate those safeguards, the courts’ current remedies,
which largely look to severance to avoid disturbance to the regulatory
scheme, may well be sufficient to render structural norms meaningful
324. See Mark Seidenfeld, Pyrrhic Political Penalties: Why the Public Would Lose
Under the “Penalty Default Canon,” 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 724, 733 (2004) (suggesting
that a “Penalty Default Canon” would likely lead to Congressional inaction).
325. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 134, at 614.
326. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 735–36 (1986).
327. See supra Part I.
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to that branch of government. But, for pragmatic or historic reasons,
judicial structural remedies often fail to validate individual interests.
Despite the Court’s protestations, the safeguards may therefore be
more akin to technicalities and protocol for regulated parties.328
Limiting structural safeguards because of concerns over
regulatory chaos would be consistent with Professor Levinson’s
theory that aggressive remedies may lead to diminished rights.329 As
Levinson noted when discussing constitutional remedies generally, as
significant remedies increase the “price” of a violation, courts will
find fewer violations.330 As fewer violations arise, the breadth and
importance of the safeguard will decrease as the courts find various
bases for finding no underlying right.
Indeed, the Court has candidly limited structural challenges to
administrative adjudication based on Article III, relying on various
pragmatic factors to avoid ever finding a violation.331 It has thereby
avoided having to decide the nature and scope of a suitable remedy.
But, as a consequence, the Court has crafted a relatively impotent
structural safeguard. For instance, in CFTC v. Schor,332 the Court
found no structural violation after taking a functional approach that
balanced several factors—including Congress’s reason for granting a
non-Article III tribunal jurisdiction to hear certain claims and the
significance of the incursion into the Article III courts’ authority.333
To be sure, the Court may be criticized for not going one step further
by acknowledging that individuals may find little value in Article III
protections within the administrative context. But its decisions clearly
reveal that because of functional or other prudential limitations, the
safeguard may provide little or no litigation benefits to a party
regulated by administrative agencies.334 And the regulated parties’
voluntary waiver of their Article III rights in that case (by agreeing to
dismiss the claims in federal court and resolve the claims before the
328. See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)) (stating that the Appointments Clause is not merely
etiquette or protocol).
329. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 889.
330. See id. (considering the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
331. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571–75 (1985); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 44–46, 50–
51 (1932). These factors include (1) whether deciding the claims implicates essential
attributes of judicial power, (2) which powers are normally exercised by Article III courts,
(3) the origin and importance of the right involved, (4) the congressional concerns that led
to innovative structures, and (5) consent. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
332. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
333. See id. at 848–51.
334. See, e.g., id.
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agency) reveals that the parties’ understood the structural safeguard
was of minimal importance to their other goals.335 In fact, the Court
moved towards removing any lingering doubt over the limited reach
of Article III into administrative adjudication in Stern, when it
repeatedly distinguished agency adjudication as different in kind from
the unconstitutional bankruptcy adjudication at issue (albeit without
explaining why).336
Judicial candor concerning structural safeguards’ and remedies’
limitations—such as in the Article III context of administrative
adjudications—is preferable to the underlying doctrine’s intentional
or subconscious obfuscation. As Professor Paul Gewirtz has cogently
argued about constitutional remedies generally, the moral basis for
judicial power and accountability is founded upon candor.337 A lack of
candor might, at times, help avoid dignitary harms or public
resistance.338 Yet the regulated parties would likely prefer to have an
honest accounting of the norm and its remedial limitations instead of
judicial blandishments, if for no other reason than to have better
information when deciding whether to invest resources in future
structural challenges.339 Furthermore, even if judicial deception might
be necessary to preserve the judiciary’s authority when the political
branches resist the courts’ judgments,340 the political branches have
not done so concerning structural defects.
When the Court is not forthright about the limitations
concerning, or absence of, a meaningful remedy, it undermines its
attempt to signal the safeguard’s importance. A first principle of
remedial theory is that “the remedy should be selected and measured
to match [the substantive] policy.”341 When courts speak in powerful
terms of a safeguard but then provide only a limited remedy without
explaining the reasons for the limitation, they are narrowing the
safeguard without registering any form of protest or otherwise
explaining the necessity of doing so.342 Not only does the relatively

335. See id.
336. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614–15 (2011).
337. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 667.
338. See id. at 668–84.
339. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 347 (Lewis White Beck
ed. & trans., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1949).
340. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 668–84.
341. DOBBS, supra note 117, at 3.
342. Limiting remedies is not only within the province of the judiciary. “Political actors
are well aware that one can limit substantive rights by limiting remedies. Substantially all
tort reform proposals actually enacted have been limitations on remedies . . . .” Douglas
Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 165 (2008).
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inconsequential remedy suggest judicial antipathy toward the right,
but the lack of candor undermines the judiciary’s authority that
derives from explaining its decisions.343 In other words, when courts
employ inadequate remedies for unexplained reasons, they weaken
both the safeguard and themselves.344 Candid judicial recognition of
its under-effective remedies is preferable to an obfuscated doctrine
for courts, for scholars, and—perhaps most importantly—for
regulated parties interested in making well-informed litigation
choices.
C.

Limiting Challenges from Regulated Parties

Judicial candor about structural remedies’ current and future
limitations might also lead to a reassessment of a closely related
issue—regulated parties’ relationship with structural safeguards.
Although the courts have referred to certain safeguards as “personal
rights” and implied private rights of action in the Constitution for
structural challenges, the lack of effective remedies for certain
safeguards suggests that there is no meaningful personal right at all.345
Instead, regulated parties have only some kind of ill-defined interest
or opportunity to register objections that often cannot be fully
vindicated.
The fact that familiar remedial values often do not rest as
comfortably in a structural context supports this view. Compensating
for past injury is difficult because of immunity and valuation issues.
Even the most successful specific-performance-like remedy only
compensates in part because it does not provide compensation for
litigation and other expenses incurred because of the structural
defect. Without monetary remedies, providing a regulated party an
incentive to litigate is difficult because the regulated party is
uncertain whether any benefit will come from the structural
343. See Gewirtz, supra note 34, at 667.
344. See Levinson, supra note 32, at 887–88 (referring to the concept of abridging a
right through limited remedies as “remedial substantiation”). When courts provide a
limited structural remedy without explaining why, they are implicitly applying a very
familiar remedial concept that is most visible in the context of breach-of-contract
remedies—waste. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112–13
(Okla. 1962) (relying on “economic waste” to provide minimal recovery to plaintiffs);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) & cmt. c (1981). The Court clearly
signals through its remedy that the breach—here of a constitutional safeguard—is a minor
transgression, not worthy of full remediation. The concept of waste may have merit in
contract law, but the concept is troubling for constitutional safeguards that are intended,
as the Court has said, to be prophylactic and, as constitutional provisions, important by
definition.
345. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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challenge. Indeed, even a victorious challenge may provide the
prevailing litigant with no substantive advantage. And deterrence
may be an inappropriate value in the structural-defect context
because the Court’s doctrine is ever shifting, rendering Congress less
blameworthy in failing to adhere to structural limits, and because
Congress may not respond to deterrence-based remedies anyway.346
Moreover, a determination of whether these values are satisfied will
often be subjective and highly indeterminate. These difficulties may
reveal judicial inattention to structural remedies. Or they could
suggest that the courts’ understanding of the current relationship
between legal safeguards and the regulated parties is unsound.347
Perhaps, instead, only the branches of government themselves
should have the ability to enforce those structural safeguards for
which regulated parties can secure no meaningful remedies. The
structural safeguards, after all, protect the three branches from one
another.348 And the branches often seek, with or without regulated
parties, to vindicate the safeguards in litigation.349 Limited structural
remedies for the branches may also be appropriate because the Court
can respect the norm largely without considering key remedial values
that matter to a “wronged” party. For instance, the President usually
loses power when legislation violates the norms of presidential
supervision under Article II or disregards the Appointments Clause.
But he or she (or his or her predecessor)—outside of the rare context
346. See Seidenfeld, supra note 324, at 733.
347. See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the
Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 n.73 (1987)
(referring to WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 38 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed. 1919)).
348. See supra Part I.
349. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
940 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1976) (per curiam); Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–30 (1935); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 107–08
(1926). There is, however, significant current debate as to whether Congress, or one of its
houses, has the right to file suit or appear in court. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2686–89 (2013) (referring favorably to the House’s participation in the lawsuit when
the Executive Branch refused to defend the federal law at issue, but noting the
problematic nature of the House’s involvement as a routine matter). Compare Tara Leigh
Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2313950 (“We argue that Congress has the constitutional
power to investigate the executive and judicially enforce subpoenas but that it cannot
defend federal statutes in court. We thereby challenge a widespread assumption among
jurists and scholars that, when the executive branch declines to defend a federal law,
Congress may take over the litigation.”), with Frost, supra note 192, at 952 (“Congress . . .
has an interest in participating in litigation to protect its institutional prerogatives, as it has
recognized in a handful of cases.”).
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of Congress overriding a President’s veto—participated in creating
the problem by signing the legislation in the first instance.350 A
minimalist remedy that removes the structural defect and otherwise
leaves the parties where they were may well be the most appropriate
remedy to account for the “prevailing” branch’s part in creating its
own injury.
Regulated parties may be left with, at best, some kind of interest
that they have standing to assert, but for which they are not entitled
to any meaningful remedy. This interest—somewhere between a right
and nothing at all—may be all that a regulated party can hope to have
in structural safeguards. If structural remedies remain inadequate,
scholars, courts, and litigants should begin to consider how remedies
for regulated parties directly affect their interest in these safeguards
and how to respond appropriately.
CONCLUSION
At their core, the remedial inadequacies for structural challenges
reveal that the Supreme Court is approaching a crossroads. It has
appeared receptive to regulated parties’ structural challenges in the
past two decades, rarely failing to exalt the U.S. Constitution’s
structural safeguards and encouraging regulated parties to assert
structural claims. But the remedies that courts have forged, by
ignoring remedial values relevant to regulated parties, have often
failed to match judicial paeans to the centrality of structural norms.
As structural litigation and inadequate structural remedies continue
to proliferate, the limited nature of structural remediation will
become only more apparent. By considering remedial values more
carefully now, all relevant players—courts, scholars, and regulated
parties—can decide how best to move forward.

350. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.

